[This is Chapter 25 of Murphey's book Socialist Thought.]

 

25

DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

To understand the relationship between socialist thought and democracy (with its attendant civil liberties), it is necessary to keep in mind all of the elements of the socialist worldview and of the sociological dynamic that has produced modern socialism.

We have talked extensively about alienation and about the alliance that intellectuals have sought with all unassimilated groups.  We have noted that extensive conceptual patterns have arisen to give expression to that alliance.  In the context of those factors, socialism has, paradoxically enough, been simultaneously elitist and democratizing.  The central role of the intellectual implies an inherent underlay of elitism, but at the same time the alliance would hardly have served the intellectuals if the so-called "masses" were not brought forward as quickly as possible into participation, leadership or even revolution, since these "masses" were precisely the battering ram by which the existing bourgeois order was to be overcome.

When Hitler championed the German “Volk,” or Lenin the “proletariat,” or a social democrat the hapless millions who stood in need of redistribution, each of them was advancing a program "for the many" that the particular socialist could easily think of as representing "democracy" in the most meaningful sense of the word.  And this is so even if totalitarian means were to be used, since the "legitimating principle" for the use of such means was at least ostensibly that they would serve the long-term interests of the many.

This equates to nothing more than a realization that the sincere proponents of each collectivist ideology have thought that they were serving the good of humanity by what they advocated.

There is a narrower (and yet still quite broad) sense in which "democracy" is used, however, that more closely comports with the usage that we ordinarily have in mind.  By "democracy" we usually mean a society in which, by and large, all adults participate and have a say, with at least formal attributes of equality about that right to participate.  Such participation necessarily presupposes, too, the characteristics of an "open society," with the "civil liberties" that allow a free flow of ideas.

If "democracy" is considered in this more usual sense, we can't affirm that there is any particular affinity between it and socialism.  Socialist thought has been torn within itself on this score, with major schools having favored totalitarianism.  Feuer, for example, says that "two impulses have always warred within the socialist tradition, an authoritarian and a democratic, for socialism indeed has emanated from two basically different psychological sources -- one the desire of the intellectuals to be the ruling class, the other the desire of the working class for a society of equals."¹   This points to the adversarial interests of the two main groups within the alliance.

I am not prepared to say that socialism necessarily moves a society away from democracy and toward totalitarianism, since the socialism in any given country will tend to reflect the cultural roots and level of civilization of that country.  Within the West, there has been an enormous fund of cultural capital left from the Enlightenment.  In a given country, it is possible that a form of socialism can continue indefinitely in a democratic mode because of that foundation.

Here, however, are the main factors, as I see them, that tend to pull socialism away from democracy:  

. The usually subtle but sometimes overt desire on the part of the intellectuals for power, status and leadership, combined with the intellectuals' anti-democratic disgust with people who are not intellectuals.

. The tendency for power to be abused.  Socialism aggregates power.  Despite the best intentions, this invites corruption, power-lust, messianism, opportunism and demagoguery.  These are by no means consistent with a healthy democracy.

. The qualitative level of humanity even in the West at the present stage in human development.   The socialist state, as Jose Ortega y Gasset suggested, becomes the instrument for the spoiledness and direct-action propensities of "mass man" (which is a term that Ortega defined to refer to the type of person who demands all of the amenities of advanced civilization without devoting any effort to being worthy of such a civilization).

. The fact that a body of "civil liberties" is actually a rare growth that presupposes a special soil.  The soil consists of the cultural capital that was accumulated during the Enlightenment.  Just how long will the residuals of that age last?  We need to keep in mind that the right of everyone to participate and to speak up violates some very strong propensities within human nature.  People are dualistic: they are expansive, inquisitive and caring; at the same time, there are powerful incentives toward what is narrow, pinched, provincial and self-interested.

. The long-term dependency of "civil liberties" upon economic freedom.  Socialist thought has preferred to see these as two totally separate things, but that, it seems to me, is an ideological indulgence.

. The erosion of mutual acceptance and compassion because of the hatreds raised to a white heat by the conflicts during the “struggle phase” of transition into socialism.  There is great social cost, especially to the prospects for democracy, from a long process of bitter social conflict.

In the rest of this chapter I will want briefly to illustrate both the democratic and the totalitarian strains within socialist thought.  We will also notice the particular slant given to the subject by Marxism-Leninism.

 

Democratic socialists.  Thomas Kirkup felt justified in saying in 1909 that "the tendency of the present socialism is more and more to ally itself with the most advanced democracy.  Socialism, in fact, claims to be the economic complement of democracy."²

In their book on the social democratic parties in Western Europe, Paterson and Thomas summarize the ideas that make up social democratic thought as being based on "a belief that social and economic reform designed to benefit the less privileged should be pursued within a framework of democracy, liberty and the parliamentary process.”³   They point to the fact that some muddying of ideological waters has been caused by the rise of Eurocommunism, in which the Communist parties have come to espouse parliamentary democracy, at least as a vehicle for transition.

The American socialist Norman Thomas has favored a democratic form of socialism.  His support for “civil liberties” appears when he says that "even in a socialist economy, the right to strike ought to exist" and that "the government must not own the press if there is to be freedom."⁴

 

Totalitarian socialists. Both Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte were authoritarian.  Lichtheim speaks of "Comte's role in formulating an authoritarian creed which a century after his death could still be invoked by Latin American military dictatorships officially committed to the Comtean slogan ‘Order and Progress.’”⁵   And Kirkup says that "Saint-Simonism represented the principle of authority, of centralization . . . With Saint-Simonism the State is the starting-point." 

            Lichtheim mentions that the Webbs showed “uncritical enthusiasm for the Soviet Union and Stalinism in the 1930s,” and says that this resulted from the Webbs’ “authoritarian attitude.”  Shaw’s “brief flirtation with Italian Fascism” is attributable, he says, to a similar mentality.

            Mussolini’s authoritarianism is apparent in his statement that “Fascism is a unit; it cannot have varying tendencies and trends . . . There is a hierarchy . . . on the summit the Chief, who is only one.”⁶

            The anti-bourgeois ideologies bring a drumbeat of criticism to bear on majority rule, parliamentary processes and the freedom of the press.  The undermining of confidence in democratic institutions and values is a precondition to their success.  Later we will see the specifically Marxist form of attack on democratic forms.  At present, it is worth noting how extensively Hitler belittled the parliamentary processes in Austria in Mein Kampf.  The picture he painted was one of weakness, chaos and foolishness: “How soon was I to grow indignant when I saw the lamentable comedy that unfolded beneath my eyes… The intellectual content of what these men said was on a really depressing level… A wild gesticulating mass screaming all at once in every different key, presided over by a good-natured old uncle… A few weeks later I was in the House again.  The picture was changed beyond recognition.  The hall was absolutely empty.  Down below everybody was asleep… What gave me most food for thought was the obvious absence of any responsibility in a single person… Can a fluctuating majority of people ever be made responsible in any case?”⁷   

In Italy, Mussolini saw Italian democracy, too, as effete and bungling.  During the 1960s and early 1970s in the United States, the New Left ridiculed all established institutions, using a form of guerrilla theater to ridicule and devalue the courts, the police, university presidents, Congressional committees and the like.  Needless to say, a bloodier form of attack has been made on the existing institutions, including those that are democratic, in the areas of the world that have been under siege from Communist revolution or anarchist terrorism.

One of the most striking authoritarian tracts I have read is Herbert Marcuse’s essay on "Repressive Tolerance."  As a theorist for the New Left, he argued that the "open market place of ideas" that had been so favored by John Stuart Mill had actually turned out to be a vehicle for bourgeois manipulation of a population that was lulled into non-revolutionary contentment by the “cooptations” that occur through affluence and "universal toleration."  He said that “universal toleration becomes questionable when its rationale no longer prevails, when tolerance is administered to manipulated and indoctrinated individuals."  He favored a "liberating tolerance," which turns out to be inverted: it was to involve actual intolerance toward any viewpoint that supported the existing society.  "Liberating tolerance," he said, “would mean intolerance against movements from the Right, and toleration of movements from the Left."⁸

 

The Marxist-Leninist perception of democracy.   Marcuse’s viewpoint is actually a variant of the long-standing Marxist-Leninist outlook, which sees democracy in the all-encompassing context of class struggle.  "In reality," Lenin wrote, "as long as there is private property, your state, even if it is a democratic republic, is nothing but a machine used by the capitalists to suppress the workers . . . Nowhere does capital rule so cynically and ruthlessly, . . . no matter how finely they are painted and notwithstanding all the talk about labor democracy and the equality of all citizens."⁹

This critique carries with it the subtleties of the historic dialectic.  The bourgeois phase is to be given its due: "The bourgeois republic, parliament, universal suffrage all represent great progress," Lenin said, "from the standpoint of the world development of society.  Mankind moved toward capitalism, and it was capitalism alone which, thanks to urban culture, enabled the oppressed class of proletarians to learn to know itself and to create the world working class movement."

It is worth noting two aspects of this: first, it provides the rationale for a thorough repudiation of parliamentary democracy, which is seen as an enemy in the current class struggle; and then, however, it is possible for the Marxist-Leninist to assert that in the broader sweep of the dialectic he is on the side of the much longer-term democratic aspirations of the masses.

Someone who does not identify with this line of thinking will take heed of the brutally anti-democratic methods that the Marxist-Leninists have been willing to use during their "revolutionary struggle."  In his The Foundations of Leninism, published in 1924, Stalin described the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism," which calls for "iron discipline" within the party organization: "After a contest of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable."¹⁰

It is relevant that at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution a vote was held - in which the Bolsheviks lost.  They went ahead with their seizure of power anyway.  Here is what Vetterli and Fort tell us: "Before the Provisional Government had been overthrown, it had set November 25 as a general election.  Under the urging of Trotsky, Lenin allowed the election to take place.  Fewer than 24 percent of the voters voted for Bolshevik candidates . . . Lenin was quick to respond.  He immediately outlawed the leading nonsocialist party, the Constitutional Democrats . . . The next step was to solidify the dictatorship through terror.”¹¹

Later, Stalin conducted, according to Michael Harrington, “a savage war against the peasantry which had no rationale in all of Marxist literature.”¹²   It isn't possible to conduct a war against so large an internal category as the "peasantry" and still maintain any pretext of "democracy."

Even in the democratic nations of the West, Communist activity should be understood in the context of eventual revolutionary strategy.  The British socialist Ralph Miliband tells us that "in the conditions of capitalist democracy, sustained electoral and political work, at all levels, must be taken as an essential part of the class struggle and of the attempt to achieve socialist implantation."¹³  This is not a genuine acceptance of the democratic processes of "bourgeois" society.

NOTES

1. Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 68, 31.

2. Thomas Kirkup, History of Socialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), pp. 10, 11.

3. William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas (ed.s), Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 11.

4. Norman Thomas, Socialism Re-Examined (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 154, 157.

5. George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 75, 201. 

6. Benito Mussolini, My Autobiography (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1939), p. 199.

7. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Sentry Edition, 1943), pp. 77, 79.

8. Herbert Marcuse, essay entitled "Repressive Tolerance" in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 90, 109.

9. Stefan Possony (ed.), The Lenin Reader (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966), p. 163.

10. Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders (ed.s), Socialist Thought (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1964), pp. 502, 503.

11. Richard Vetterli and William E. Fort, Jr., The Socialist Revolution (Los Angeles: Clute International Corporation, no year given), pp. 130-131.

12. Michael Harrington, Socialism (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1970), p. 173.

13. Ralph Miliband and John Seville (ed.s), The Socialist Register 1977 (London: The Merlin Press, 1977), p.49.