[This is Chapter 20 of Murphey’s book Socialist Thought.]
CHAPTER
20
CRITIQUE
OF THE MARKET SYSTEM
Socialist thought has devoted a certain fraction of its energies to considering what sort of socialism is desirable and how it will work, although some socialists have remained quite sketchy about those things. In Chapter 21 we will review the assortment of economic and political models that have been proposed.
Substantially more attention has been devoted to an unfavorable critique of capitalism. Ernest Mandel, for example, has written An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, in which all the theory discussed pertains to capitalism. There is a total preoccupation with the negative critique of capitalism, and no section describes how the Marxist “classless society” would function. The omission is not, however, a quirk introduced by Mandel; it reflects Marx’s own preoccupation.
Socialists should have the burden of proving a collectivist economic system is workable, by which I mean conducive to a high level of satisfaction of humanity’s desire for goods and services. Nevertheless, the preoccupation with critiquing capitalism is understandable.
One of the explanations for the alienation of the intellectual was the “substantive theory.” This held that intellectuals have reacted to deep flaws within capitalism. If this explanation were given high rank, it would amply justify the socialists’ having devoted so much attention to those flaws.
Even if that explanation were considered secondary, as I do consider it, the emphasis on the negative critique of capitalism would be understandable in light of the other explanations for the alienation: the rivalry for power arising out of the intellectuals’ displacement, envy and difference in temperament; and the alliance with the have-nots.
The socialists’ negative critique contains many seemingly disparate points. To organize the material for convenience, I will consider these under three general headings:
· A criticism of the values and human relationships within capitalist society.
· A criticism of the allocation of resources and of the distribution of income.
· A criticism of several aspects of the functioning structure of capitalism.
1. Socialists have often criticized capitalism for emphasizing personal gain, competition and economic ends. This holds that the individual should be more “other-oriented,” less egocentric. The relationships should be centered on mutual benevolence rather than being adversarial in nature; people should take pleasure in each other’s accomplishments instead of being pitted against one another for comparison’s sake. The gratifications of materialistic seeking should be subordinated, too, to a number of other values that are given a low place, in the socialist’s opinion, in an acquisitive society.
Thus, Robert Heilbroner has been able to speak of “the endless and relentless exacerbation of economic appetites in advanced capitalism.” He has referred to “the more grotesque forms of commercialism.”1 Among the Nazis, Hitler and Goebbels saw the bourgeoisie as “still imprisoned by liberalism and held enthralled by the lure of Mammon.”2
The “lure of Mammon,” the socialist feels, excludes important dimensions of human personality. Lichtheim spoke of “an organizing principle that took no account of noneconomic ends.”3 G.D.H. Cole wrote that “the qualities which Capitalism requires, and for which it selects its men, are by no means coextensive with the good qualities of humanity. There are some good qualities which are of no use, and others which are a positive drawback from the capitalist standpoint.”4
This reminds me of Emerson’s complaint a century and a half ago that “a young man, on entering life… must forget the prayers of his childhood.” He said that “the general system of our trade is a system of selfishness; is not dictated by the high sentiments of human nature.”5 In my own writing I have emphasized, precisely from a classical liberal point of view, that such deficiencies deserve serious concern, since I believe they do exist. I differ from the socialist about them in two main ways: First, I don’t attribute the weaknesses exclusively to the impact of a market system, since I see other aspects of the human condition as having a major bearing on them. Second, I see significant humanistic contributions from the freedom and productivity of the market, which I think socialists almost invariably choose to overlook.
As to the opposition to competitive relationships, Sombart has said that “every Socialist must obviously repudiate the competitive principle.”6 And Bellamy wrote about his utopia that “buying and selling is considered absolutely inconsistent with the mutual benevolence and disinterestedness which should prevail between citizens and the sense of community of interest which supports our social system. According to our ideas, buying and selling is essentially anti-social in all its tendencies. It is an education in self-seeking at the expense of others.”7 Eugene Kamenka says that under Communism “no longer would man’s fellow human beings confront him as competitors… (I)n other men he would find partners in that spontaneous but co-operative creativity that distinguishes man as a universal and social being…”8
2. One of the crucial attitudes relating to relationships is the socialist opposition to the wage relation. This is a part of socialist economic theory, but it also has broader “quality of life” implications. I have already discussed much that pertains to it in my chapter on the theories of exploitation and in my discussion of the Marxian concept of “reification.” Here, I will want to do no more than illustrate the socialists’ own references to the problem.
Ernest Mandel has explained the Marxist concept of
“alienation” by comparing a “commodity producing society” with a primitive
society. “In the periods between
catastrophes … (primitive) society endowed all human activities with a large
degree of unity, harmony and stability… Labor was not looked upon as an obligation
imposed from without, first of all because it was far less intense, far less
exhausting than under capitalism today.
It conformed more closely to the rhythms of the human organism…
Furthermore, there was a unity between the producer, his product and its
consumption, since he generally produced for his own use or for those close to
him… In other words, it is the
consequence of working for the market, for unknown customers.”9
This would apply beyond the wage relation to encompass all persons selling what they produce, but it is especially emphasized as significant for the worker: Leopold Senghor has said that “in the capitalistic system… the product of his labor is snatched from the producer, in the form of surplus value.” He has gone on to say that “production is imposed on the producer from outside. ‘It is forced labor.’ It is not the satisfaction of an inner need for creation, ‘but a means to satisfy needs external’ to man.”10
There is in all this a desire for a return to the more pastoral simplicity of a less complicated way of life. In effect, it is a repudiation of the Industrial Revolution, since it looks unfavorably upon the division of labor. Along these lines, Marek Fritzhand has written that “the ‘total’ man is independent of the division of labor which cripples, impoverishes, and ‘functionalizes’ human beings.”11
On a more commonsense dimension, it is a revulsion against the more neurotic features of our mass- media, consumption-preoccupied society. Sombart reveals this sensibility in a passage attacking advertising: “Will we never learn that it is not a part of a cultured people to permit itself to be continually tortured – at every turn, at home and on the streets – by obtrusive, talkative profit-chasers, to be continually reminded by word and picture of the most distasteful events of life or be given a glance into strange bedrooms, when there may be other things on ones mind?”12 This is an observation that Richard Weaver of the Burkean school could easily have concurred in, and that I as a classical liberal feel hits the mark. This more limited observation need involve no repudiation of a market society; but it does suggest the need for concern about the cultural tone and its effects on the existential quality of human life.
Not only is the worker producing for
other people and for the profit of his employer; he is working also, say many
socialists, without the benefit of “cooperative” and “democratic”
relationships. Laslett
and Lipset have said that “socialism was a concept of
the role of labor in society. This was
the whole notion of industrial democracy.”13 Lassalle wrote
that “to make the working class their own employers – that is the means, the
only means…”14
3. Socialists frequently deny that there is a harmony of interests in a market system. They generally hold to what Ludwig von Mises called “the Montaigne Dogma” (which is often referred to today, in the technical jargon of modern social science, as a “zero sum game”): that each person’s gain is someone else’s loss. This concept is enough in itself to place them fully at odds with the worldview of classical liberalism as developed by Mandeville, Smith and Ricardo, which is that a system of interacting individuals can work well for everyone’s benefit.
Engels saw competition as “the completest
expression of the battle of all against all.”15 Bellamy wrote that the social and industrial
system of the nineteenth century taught men “to view their natural prey in
their fellow-men and find their gain in the loss of others.”16
This was the basis for George Bernard Shaw’s simplistic view of economics. He saw the entire economic problem as being one of dividing a fixed economic pie. We see his assumption of a static quantity of goods and services, and how this assumption leads to his acceptance of the Montaigne Dogma, in his statement that “as the quantity to be distributed each year is limited, if Mrs. Dickson’s child… gets more, Mrs. Johnson’s child… must get less.”17 There is necessarily a conflict of interests among people where a static economy is presumed, since anyone’s gain diminishes to that extent everyone else’s share. This view also leads directly into the role of the planner, since the main problem becomes one of “equitably” seeing to it that the “shares” are fairly distributed.
In Capital, Marx quoted with favor from the Venetian monk Ortes about “the antagonism of capitalist production as a general natural law of social wealth.” Ortes had written that “in the economy of a nation, advantages and evils always balance one another: the abundance of wealth with some people is always equal to the want of it with others.”18
We have seen before that Werner Sombart, writing during his Nazi phase, expressed many of the socialist concepts with perhaps the greatest clarity. He does the same here: “The audacious idea of a fundamentally free legal and political order falls short of madness only if one believes in a prestabilized harmony of individual interests. If this belief falls away – and our time can no longer cherish it – then it follows of itself that the principle of order cannot emanate from the individual will but from the common will which is guided by super-individual reason.”19
It illustrates the diversity of socialist thought, however, to point out that Bertrand Russell rejected the Montaigne Dogma.20
4. The advocates of any philosophy will most commonly fail to understand empathetically the point of view of other philosophies, so it isn’t unexpected that socialists generally lack any real understanding of the classical liberal aspiration for a “free society.” Just as this myopia is a fault when found in others, it is also a weakness in socialist thought.
Accordingly, all George Bernard Shaw saw about classical economic theory was that “political economy becomes an impudent demonstration that the wages of the poor cannot be raised; that without the idle rich we should perish for lack of capital and employment; and that if the poor would take care to have fewer children everything would be for the best in the worst of all possible worlds.”21
Proudhon wrote that “on the pretext that it is a law of economics and the will of destiny, they remorselessly sacrifice humanity to Mammon. This is what has distinguished the economist school in its struggle against socialism.”22
This pinched perception has limited the ability of socialists to see a
number of things objectively. Leon
Trotsky, for example, was so wrapped up in alienation and revolutionary fervor
that he saw the period between 1905 and 1917 in
1. Socialists generally take the productive processes of the economy for granted as though they are givens. They consider distribution the central issue. Since distribution is separated from production in their thinking, there is little reason to want the distribution to reflect market processes.
Robert Heilbroner has caught the essence of it when he has spoken of the “privilege” within capitalism as stemming from “the right to reap private benefit from the use of the means of production.”23 We need to notice what this says: it assumes the “means of production” as already present; and it considers any profit going to individuals a type of privileged dispensation.
Tragically for classical liberalism, John Stuart Mill accepted the collectivist ideal. Mill expressed it well in his book on Comte: “Every person who lives by any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an individual working for his private benefit, but as a public functionary; and his wages, of whatever sort, not as the remuneration or purchase-money of his labor, which should be given freely, but as the provision meade by society to enable him to carry it on.” Mill basically did not favor the classical liberal principle of remuneration-according-to-contract: “The rough method of settling the laborer’s share of the produce, the competition of the market, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly not a moral ideal… Until laborers and employers perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform that of an army, industry will never be moralized.”24 Accordingly, distribution would not be by contract, which is multi-centered, but by “the society” through its collective processes. The market is criticized as neither fully moral nor rational.
2. Classical liberals have praised the market economy because it makes “an optimum allocation of resources” that “responds to ‘consumer sovereignty.’” This concept is so accepted that it is repeated without question within current “Business and Society” literature. In my book on classical liberalism, I have pointed out, however, that this rationale for the market is logically flawed.25 There is no such thing as an optimum allocation of resources without presupposing a standard of individual or collective judgment, which is something a classical liberal cannot do consistently with the rest of his philosophy. I support the allocation of resources made by a market economy because that is the allocation that results from freedom, not because it meets any expectation that I have about an “optimum allocation.”
Most socialists have had little difficulty brushing aside any identification with the allocation of resources made by the market. They take it for granted that the flow of resources resulting from the choices of millions of separate people, especially as those choices are influenced by those who desire to sell to consumers, is essentially irrational and out-of-keeping with what an overview of human needs and aspirations would call for.
We saw earlier that Paul Medow has addressed the “optimum allocation of resources” rationale. In the present context, it is worth seeing his argument more completely: “The formal aspects of mathematical programming have made it fully clear that an optimal allocation of means can be identified only after there is full agreement concerning the basic ends that the economy is to serve, the particular set of policy objectives that are to be regarded as dominant… (T)here exists, in fact, as many optimal ways of allocating resources as there are political opinions….” He explains that “the mathematical formulation of the analysis of optimal resource allocation has become known as ‘linear programming’… It may be applied to any type of means-ends structure in which the ends can be achieved with more than one set of means, and in which the possibility of substituting one set of means for another is therefore present.”26
For these reasons, Medow does not implicitly accept the allocations made by the market. He sees it as good that the analysis of resource allocation has been “freed” from “its traditional dependence on market processes.” This involves (and here we see his socialist preference) “the liberation of the ideals of humanism from their association with contractual relationships.” He prefers to adopt “a wider concept of macroeconomic rationality.”
Although Medow’s discussion is the most thorough I have seen, other socialists have reflected the same perspective, even though most of the time they don’t articulate the conceptual issue so sharply. Heilbroner does not accept the allocations made by the market, for example, when he says that “under a system that abdicates as much decision making as possible to the rule of profit, the possibilities for a rational restraint over the forces rearranging our lives shrinks to a minimum.”27 Bertrand Russell wrote that “the notion that the desirable activities are those that bring a profit has made everything topsy-turvy.”28 Michael Harrington has spoken of “the waste, reduplication and pseudo-needs that are so important to capitalism.”29 He obviously does not accept the notion that the market automatically makes the most appropriate allocation.
An associated point, which appears above in Harrington’s reference to “pseudo-needs,” is that the socialist does not accept “consumer demand” as a valid reflection of what should be desired from an economic system. Erich Fromm has said that “the task for the socialist theoreticians is to study the nature of human needs; to find criteria for the distinction between genuine human needs…and synthetic needs created by capitalism, which tend to weaken man, to make him more passive and bored, a slave to his greed for things.”30
The reader will by now certainly recognize in this the desire to substitute the judgment of a social critic or perhaps a social scientist for the judgments of hundreds of millions of people pursuing their own perceptions of what is desirable for themselves. Although I am aware of the flaw in the classical liberals’ usual “optimum allocation of resources” argument, I nevertheless see the issue of resource allocation as mainly an antagonism between freedom and direction.
3. An issue that relates to the matters of allocation and distribution is the one that pertains to the legitimacy of profit. The most prominent argument against profit is the socialist version of the Labor Theory of Value, which we have already discussed, although the Labor Theory of Value itself is nothing more than a theorem deduced from the socialists’ already-existing preference for a centrally directed economy.
A common expression by socialists is to make a distinction between “production for profit” and “production for use.” G.D.H. Cole wrote that “it is my fundamental contention, and that of all Socialists, that the root inefficiency of industry lies in the fact that it is at present organized for profit, whereas it should be organized for use.”31 The Dolbeares say that “of equal importance to Marxists is the goal of reorienting the productive processes of the society from production for profit to production for use.”32 This distinction is simply another way of expressing the desire to shift from market allocation to a directed one.
1. The claim is often made, especially by Marxist thought, that capitalism leads to monopoly. Mandel says that “the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels emphasizes the fact that capitalism, which claims to defend private property, is in reality a destroyer of this private property, and carries out a constant, permanent expropriation of a great number of proprietors by a relatively small number of proprietors… (F)ree competition produces concentration, and concentration produces… monopoly.”33
Some socialists have seen the concentration of capital as advantageous because it provides a route to socialism. Kirkup says that “the supporters of the trusts maintain with very good show of reason that unregulated competition is harmful and may be ruinous to all concerned, and that they can maintain fair prices, pay fair wages, and secure a fair return to capital only by mutual arrangement among the producers…There is only one right way out of such a dilemma. A return to the competitive method is neither possible nor desirable. Monopoly is incompatible with freedom. The only course for peoples who desire to be free is to adopt some form of social ownership and control.”34
Classical liberals, of course, believe that this all amounts to wishful thinking, either for a collapse of capitalism or for its transition to socialism. Milton Friedman, very much a supporter of capitalism, has written that “the most important fact about enterprise monopoly is its relative unimportance from the point of view of the economy as a whole.”35 Ideology makes a lot of difference in how such matters are perceived.
2. Twentieth century American liberalism, which is to be distinguished from classical liberalism, has often reiterated a criticism of modern capitalism that was spelled out by Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, published in 1932.
Berle and Means observed that in large business corporations the control is not in the hands of the owners, the stockholders. “Control,” they said, “may be held by the directors or titular managers who can employ the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as a group they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding.”36 They suggested that this makes the corporation more “quasi-public” than private. They preferred a “solution” similar to that offered earlier by Herbert Croly, which was to marry the modern corporation to the state as an instrument of state policy. “Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community… (T)he ‘control’ of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy….”
That this was essentially a socialist critique justifying direction at the hands of the government is transparent; but modern liberalism has been anxious to dissimulate about it. Accordingly, liberal writing simply refers back to Berle and Means as though they, and not identifiable socialists, originated the critique.
But such attribution is sheer dissimulation. The critique was well established within
socialist writing before Berle and Means popularized
it in the
The British socialist G.D.H. Cole had written that “it is, of course, commonplace that the development of capitalism and the growth of joint-stock enterprise have more and more divorced the ultimate ownership from the actual control and management of industry.”38
Thomas Kirkup, in his History of Socialism published in 1909, wrote that “the development of the company in a large degree means that the real administration of the economic movement is passing out of the hands of the owner of capital as such… The capitalists do not really manage the companies in which their capital is embarked.”39
In the preceding volume, I have given the classical liberals’ response to this critique of corporations. Needless to say, they do not accept it as a rationale for moving away from the market. “The thesis,” I said, “sets up a straw man as an alleged principle of private property. This is that for legitimacy there has to be a close connection between ownership and management… What’s important to classical liberalism in this connection is that the relationship of the stockholders and the managers be freely contractual… There are forms of ‘accountability’ other than at stockholders’ meetings, although of course there is some accountability there, too. If the stockholders freely invest their money, with adequate information and without fraud, the classical liberal won’t ask for more….” If the managers don’t perform well, I said, profitability will be affected. Both debt and equity capital will flow toward other opportunities.40
3. Marxism points to the trade cycle as the ultimate “contradiction” within capitalism. It does not accept the economic thinking of pro-market economists who expect supply and demand to clear markets of goods and who believe that a market economy can work satisfactorily if the appropriate monetary framework is provided. In keeping with this denial of classical economic theory, Marxism denies the validity of monetarist theory and asserts that there are insurmountable problems of overproduction and under consumption.
Marx’s own denial of monetarist theory appears in his statement in Capital that “the superficiality of Political Economy shows itself in the fact that it looks upon the expansion and contraction of credit, which is a mere symptom of the periodic changes of the industrial cycle, as their cause.”41
Ernest Mandel says that “the factor of periodic economic crises is inherent in the capitalist system and remains insurmountable… Capitalist economic crises are incredible phenomena like nothing ever seen before. They are not crises of scarcity, like all pre-capitalist crises; they are crises of over-production.”42 Adam Ulam has written that “the Great Depression (was) a logical and unavoidable culmination of unplanned capitalism.”43
Although Mandel speaks of “overproduction” in the passage just quoted, Norman Thomas prefers to think in terms of “underconsumption.” He has written that “Marx stated a Theory of Recurring Crises of unemployment and suffering. Such crises, he held, are inherent in the capitalist system. They are due not to overproduction but to underconsumption.”44
This interplay between consumption and production, as seen by Marxists, has been explained by Maurice Cornforth. He says the desire for profit causes capitalists to keep the pay of the worker as low as possible: “…The capitalist accumulation is realized out of surplus value. Whatever makes for better living for the workers is therefore always opposed by the steady pressure engendered by capitalist accumulation to make living standards deteriorate.” This produces a recession or depression when the workers don’t have the means to consume the products of an ever-increasing industrial machine: “’The last cause of all real crises,’ wrote Marx, ‘always remains the… restricted consumption of the masses compared to the tendency of capitalist production to develop the productive forces as if only the absolute power of consumption of the entire society would be their limit.”45
This type of thinking is, of course, in the same generic category as the Mercantilist objections that “a market can’t possibly work: it will be chaos.” Adam Smith, David Ricardo and J. B. Say formulated many of the principles of classical economics precisely to refute such arguments.
To point this out is not to say, however, that the trade cycle is not one of the great weaknesses of market economies as they have actually existed. A failure to overcome the trade cycle has done capitalism great damage, including in the intellectual sphere. Marxism notwithstanding, the solutions do exist in the theory of the market. What remains an open question is whether the political, social and ideological factors in modern society will permit the solutions to be adopted and then maintained as a part of the permanent framework of the society.
4. In the chapter on exploitation theory, I pointed to a number of situations in which imperfections in markets can cause an insufficient meeting of human needs. I pointed toward solutions compatible with a market economy. Socialists necessarily have been acutely aware of such imperfections and have incorporated them into their anti-capitalist critique.
I mentioned in that earlier chapter how Jack London used the story of a worker who lost his arm in an industrial accident as a powerful polemical weapon against capitalism. It is not surprising the Frederick Engels discussed the problem of industrial accident in his book about the condition of the working class in England.45
Engels also commented about how the various incidents of employment are established by the employer and how these incidents are not meaningfully determined by a contractual process, which is something I discussed in detail in the chapter on exploitation theory. “Here the employer is absolute law-giver,” Engels wrote. “He makes regulations at will, changes and adds to his codex at pleasure, and even, if he inserts the craziest stuff, the courts say to the workingman: ‘You were your own master, no one forced you to agree to such a contract if you did not wish to.…’”
Classical liberalism has been hurt badly by its failure to develop an appropriate theory about these things. Its failure has been a result of the defensive posture into which it has fallen for the past century, which has not allowed it to look critically at the system it supports. This deficiency has added immensely to the plausibility of the socialist critique.
5.
A by-product of the socialist perception of a market
economy is that “economic freedom” as understood by the classical liberal is
not part of the catalogue of liberties supported by non-totalitarian
socialists. A dichotomy is drawn
between “human rights” and “property rights,” which implicitly excludes
property rights from the category of acknowledged human rights. Thus,
Lord Beveridge could say that “the lot of essential
liberties does not include liberty of a private citizen to own means of
production and to employ other citizens in operating at a wage… It is not an
essential citizen liberty in
Ernst Block has spoken of the “mere freedom of enterprise.”48 Galvano della Volpe refers to “civil liberties with an inferior egalitarian exponent… such as economic free enterprise and relative private ownership of means of production,” which he says will be “eradicated” in a “true socialist State.”49
1. Robert L. Heilbroner, The Limits of American Capitalism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 96.
2. George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966), p. 94.
3. George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 17.
4.
G.D.H. Cole, Labour
in the Commonwealth (
5. Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Portable Emerson (New York: Viking Press, 1946), pp. 71, 72.
6. Werner Sombart, A New Social Philosophy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 275.
7. Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward (New York: Modern Library, 1942), p. 69.
8. Article by Eugene Kamenka, “Marxian Humanism and the Crisis in Socialist Ethics,” Socialist Humanism, Erich Fromm (ed.) (Garden city: Anchor Books, 1965), p. 119.
9. Ernest Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp. 12, 13.
10. Article by Leopold Senghor, “Socialism is a Humanism,” Socialist Humanism, p. 174.
11. [Missing from book as published.]
12. Sombart, A New Social Philosophy, p. 275.
13. John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.s), Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974), p. 11.
14. The German Classics (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 1914), p. 508.
15. Frederick
Engels, The
Condition of Working-Class in
16. Bellamy, Looking Backward, p. 225.
17. George Bernard Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism (New York: Brentano’s Publishers, 1928), p. 11.
18. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: Modern Library, 1906), p. 709.
19. Sombart, A New Social Philosophy, p. 208.
20. Article by Bertrand Russell, “In Praise of Idleness,” Socialist Humanism, p. 247.
21. Shaw, Woman’s Guide, p. 64.
22. Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York: Grossett & Dunlap, 1930), p. 180. The quote from Proudhon in the preceding paragraph may be found in his Selected Writings (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 50.
23. Heilbroner, Limits, p. 71.
24. John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 147, 149.
25. Dwight D. Murphey, Burkean Conservatism and Classical Liberalism (Washington: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 139-143, 429-431.
26. Article by Paul Medow, “The Humanistic Ideals of the Enlightenment and Mathematical Economics,” Socialist Humanism, pp. 410-415.
27. Heilbroner, Limits, p. 98.
28. Article by Russell, Socialist Humanism, p. 256.
29. Michael Harrington, Socialism (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1970), p. 350.
30. Article by Erich Fromm, “The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx’s Theory, Socialist Humanism, p. 238.
31. Laslett and Lipset, Failure of a Dream?, p. 124.
32. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, American Ideologies (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 201.
33. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, p. 45.
34. Thomas Kirkup, History of Socialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), pp. 359-360.
35. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1962), p. 121.
36. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), pp.5, 356.
37. Maurice Cornforth, The Open Philosophy and the Open Society (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 191.
38. Cole, Labour, p. 107.
39. Kirkup, History, p. 356.
40. Murphey, Burkean Conservatism and Classical Liberalism, pp. 427, 428.
41. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: Modern Library, 1906), p. 695.
42. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, pp. 53, 52.
43. Adam B. Ulam, Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 139.
44. Norman Thomas, Socialism Re-examined (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, inc., 1963), p. 37.
45. Cornforth, Open Society, pp. 210, 212.
46. Engels, Condition of Working-Class, pp. 165, 179.
47. Ulam, Philosophical, p. 148.
48. Article by Ernst Block, “Man and Citizen According to Marx,” Socialist Humanism, p. 221.
49. Article by Galvano della Volpe, “The Legal Philosophy of Socialism,” Socialist Humanism, p. 437.