[This is Chapter Two of Murphey’s book Socialist Thought.]

 

Chapter 2

 

ALIENATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL

 

            My studies have led me to a conclusion that will not surprise many students of modern history and the history of ideas, but that may startle the average person, whose everyday life does not cause him to think in these terms.  It is this: That there is perhaps no fact more important to understanding modern civilization than the "alienation of the intellectual.”

            After the shattering of the medieval consensus, the secular civilization that ensued was almost certainly headed into a long existential quest to "find itself." No dependable models were handed down from the past. It would seem, however, that the neurotic self-laceration and angry divisions -- which have permeated our thinking to the extent of having become comprehensive hostile systems that see life in widely divergent ways -- have gone far beyond a normal existential seeking.  The process could have been far less fevered. It would have been if the modern intellectual had been fundamentally at peace with the West’s predominant culture.

            The rise of modern socialism in its many varieties has been a major result of these divisions. The alienation of the intellectual and the intellectuals’ resulting quest for an alliance with the unassimilated elements in every society have been at the heart of the rise of socialism. I doubt whether there would have been a massive socialist thrust in Europe, and through Europe in the rest of the world, if it had not been for the alienation.

            This alienation was the main topic in the first book in this series, Understanding the Modern Predicament.  What was said there is important to understanding socialism:

            “The alienation of the modern intellectual from the great middle class -- the ‘bourgeoisie’ -- …has been of particular importance during the past two and a half centuries, if we date it from Rousseau.  There has been an enormous tension between the intellectual subculture and the predominant type of man within the larger culture.  This tension must be understood if we are to grasp the competing value systems and ‘systems of interpretation’ within our society.

            “There is, of course, some embarrassment when we are asked to define the word ‘intellectual,’ even though this term is central to ‘the alienation of the intellectual.’  Nor is there absolute clarity in speaking of the ‘bourgeoisie.’

            “We will have to bear with these embarrassments and avoid any attempt at precise definition.  The historic phenomenon with which I will be concerned is palpable enough that we need not delineate it closely at the edges.  I will often refer to the ‘intellectual’ in a sympathetic sense as the ‘thoughtful and sensitive’ man, the man of ‘tender conscience’ in Emerson’s phrase, whose life involves an emphasis on contemplation and theory and a sincere concern for ideas.  This is the man of books and words, often the academic man, who is removed from active life within the cloister of a protected, cerebral existence.  And I will use the term in a broad sense to include a variety of men and not just the giants of thought (who in their independence are probably less involved in the mass alienation than are lesser intellectuals).  In doing so, I will be departing from Aquinas’ usage.

            “It is also worth noting that when I will speak of the ‘alienation of the intellectual’ I will be making a generalization that has had many exceptions.  By no means have all modern intellectuals shared the alienation.  Many have devoted their lives to opposing it, although for many years these have been in the minority…

            “Still further, there is a problem from the snobbery inherent in the work ‘intellectual.’  It is not just the bookish man who thinks.  Intelligent businessmen sometimes take offence at the entire concept of an ‘alienated intellectuality,’ since they are not willing to concede that the alienated group has a corner on intellectuality.  Ayn Rand has championed this viewpoint by stressing the extent to which the acting man brings intelligence to bear on reality.

            “I agree with this criticism, but in another sense I demur from it.  We need some term to reflect the difference between someone who devotes himself to ideas and sensibilities and others who do not.  Each deserves credit, but they are not the same.  If we can use ‘intellectual’ without belittling others, it seems the appropriate term to connote sustained effort in abstract ideas.

            “Even after these qualifications, we come to yet another difficulty.  When intellectuality goes beyond individual effort and becomes a group phenomenon, the ‘intelligentsia’ becomes a subculture.  But many who assume the lifestyle and accoutrements of that subculture are in no real sense ‘intellectuals’ in the more favorable meaning of that term.  Some are mere camp followers.  Not everyone in Greenwich Village has been an intellectual in the fullest sense, but even those who are not are still part of the subculture…

            “As to the concept of the ‘bourgeoisie,’ I have already mentioned the difficulty that comes from the fact that the intellectual actually seems to have been alienated from the entire spectrum of contemporary men.  Even where he has allied with the have-nots, he intends their ultimate reformation.  The word ‘bourgeoisie’ is too narrow to denote the true object of the alienation. If it serves at all, it must be to mean everyone who stands within the predominant culture. It will not do, at least in this century, to narrow the meaning to a smaller group with specific characteristics. Even the substitute term 'middle class' isn't fully adequate, since the alienation also runs against any so-called 'upper class' and reaches in the other direction to include, say, the blue collar worker. The alienation has been so extensive that it is an alienation against modern Western civilization itself. But we will be justified in speaking of the alienation as being against the middle class or bourgeoisie -- both to remain consistent with the usual way in which it is expressed and because the 'middle class' is so broad today as virtually to cover our entire society anyway. The ideology expressing the alienation has cast itself in anti-capitalist terms, stressing its conflict especially with the bourgeoisie…

            "It would take quite an enormous book to illustrate adequately the full range of alienation in modern European thought. The reader will need to understand that my references here are the barest sample.

            "Julien Benda's well known book The Betrayal of the Intellectuals…has much to say about the alienation and neuroses within modern intellectuality.  ‘For twenty centuries,’ he says, 'the "clerks" preached to the world that the State should be just; now they proclaim that the State should be strong and should care nothing about being just... This denunciation of liberalism, notably by the vast majority of contemporary men of letters, will be one of the things in this age most astonishing to History, especially on the part of the French.' (Emphasis added)  In the modern intellectual 'the soul or Greece has given place to the soul of Prussia among the educators of mankind.' He noted 'the cult of success,' by which ‘I mean the teaching which says that when a will is successful that fact alone gives it a moral tone... This philosophy... is professed by many a modern teacher in political life (it may be said, by all in Germany since Hegel, and by a large number in France since de Maistre).' He spoke particularly of Nietzsche, Barres, Peguy and Sorel...

            "In The Open Society and Its Enemies, Karl Popper discussed important parts of this alienation. Picking up a phrase from Schopenhauer, he referred to an 'age of dishonesty.'  It was Hegel, he said, who mainly originated the mentality 'controlled by the magic of high-sounding words, and by the power of jargon.'  Hegel 'became the first official philosopher of Prussianism.'  From Hegel came a left wing that 'replaces the war of nations which appears in Hegel's historicist scheme by a war of classes' and an extreme right wing that 'replaces it by the war of the races.' Popper further illustrated the point Benda made about an anti-liberal exaltation of power when he quoted Hegel to the effect that 'the State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth... We must therefore worship the State...'  This led Hegel to juridical positivism -- 'the doctrine that might is right.'

            "It is far too superficial to assign the tendencies of an age to just one man, but in Hegel we see an intellectual root for the totalitarianisms that have so greatly embodied the intellectual and social pathologies of the nineteenth and ninetieth centuries. And, too, there are important inputs into Nazism in Nietzsche's writing, despite many insights scattered like gems within his writing. Nietzsche denounced liberalism as mere 'herd-animalization' and saw democracy as a ‘form of decline in organizing power.'  He spoke of 'the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats.'  He exalted the 'will to power' and in The Antichrist he defined as good 'everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself' and as bad 'everything that is born of weakness.’  He exposed the depth of his alienation when he wrote that 'there are days when I am afflicted with a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy -- contempt of man.  And to leave no doubt concerning what I despise: it is the man of today.' (His emphasis)  He was passionately aristocratic, and affirmed 'the order of castes, the order of rank,' which he said, merely formulates the highest-law of life.'

            "Nietzsche’s work contains many valuable insights; the open-minded John Stuart Mill would certainly have acknowledged that Nietzsche knew his own corners of the truth.  But there should be little trouble in recognizing the monstrous nihilism Nietzsche also represented.  Although many authors downplay the notion, I see little reason to hesitate in confirming the connection between his thought and that that later moved Hitler.

            "In Mein Kampf, Hitler echoed the anti-bourgeois alienation: 'As a young scamp in my wild years, nothing had so grieved me as having been born at a time which obviously erected its Halls of Fame only to shopkeepers and government officials... This development seemed not only to endure but was expected in time (as was universally recommended) to remodel the whole world into one big department store in whose vestibules the busts of the shrewdest profiteers and the most lamblike administrative officials would be garnered for all eternity... Why couldn't I have been born a hundred years earlier?  Say at the time of the Wars of Liberation when a man, even without a 'business,' was really worth something?!  Thus I had often indulged in angry thoughts concerning my earthly pilgrimage.'

            “In Germany the 'Storm and Stress' movement a century earlier had been followed by the Romantic movement.  Each was a reaction against the Enlightenment.  Reinhold Aris has written an illuminating history of German thought from the beginning of the French Revolution to 1815, and it is worth noting the direction the thinking was taking.  Of the Romantics, he says that ‘all these thinkers were anti-bourgeois’ and tells us that they were deeply opposed to modern rationalism. He says that ‘no one clung to the ancient order of society so uncompromisingly’ as Justus Moser; ‘no one turned against new ideas more resolutely than he.’  Despite the superlative applied to Moser, he says about Herder that ‘there is no other thinker of the period in whose works anti-rational tendencies found such strong expression as in his.’  He traced Herder’s rejection of the Enlightenment into the thinking of Fichte, Schelling, F. Schlegel and Hegel, where it fertilized both nationalism and historicism.  Alienated against modern society, Herder was one of the first to seek a rehabilitated view of the Middle Ages.

            Aris next tells us of de Maistre, who ‘lost himself in mystical speculation and in a passionate attempt to re-establish the superiority of the highest medieval power in Europe, the Pope.’  He is followed in Aris’ account by Novalis, ‘the most important thinker amongst the early Romantics,’ who was a ‘mystic impressionist’ and who joined in the flight from the Enlightenment.  Novalis joined many others in exalting the State.  This was a theme picked up by Schlegel; and a certain refrain becomes monotonous in the history:  ‘Here again we meet that distrust of capitalism which is one of the characteristics of Romantic thought.’  Schleiermacher in his turn deprecated the bourgeois ‘desire for personal happiness’ and stressed that ‘to give oneself to the community becomes an ethical duty.’ It is with foreboding that I read Aris’ comment that in Schleiermacher we see ‘the first traces of the modern racial theory.’

            Aris’ narrative is a good one, but the unavoidable redundancy of its subject matter is apparent as he goes on to Adam Muller, who again was ‘carried away by an unbridled mysticism, in which the State becomes the “totality of life.”’ This constantly reiterated theme shows that modern European thought experienced an explosion of philosophies hostile to the main body of the civilization.  The thinkers have often been mystical, aristocratic, statist; and their writing has run like rivulets into later thought which has continued the hostility.  From a distance it is difficult to tell the mystical and aristocratic views from much socialist thought, except that the various socialist models, both Left and Right, have differed from a purely aristocratic view by seeking mass support.  All of them have been profoundly alienated.”1

            These passages from Understanding the Modern Predicament demonstrate that alienation was a major phenomenon and show how widespread it was among intellectuals in general.  There were notable exceptions, to be sure; not all intellectuals formed anti-bourgeois ideologies.  But the overwhelming thrust, which is both tragic and ironic, is that at the very same time that the West was emerging from the Age of Kings, feudalism and towering religion into a secular age of economic expansion, Industrial Revolution, individual enterprise, religious tolerance, political freedom, rationalism and science, these developments were bitterly opposed by intellectuals of many persuasions.

It will be important for us to understand how fundamental this alienation has been to the rise of modern socialism.  There would be considerable advantage in quoting the alienated comments of socialist authors at length at this juncture, so that the reader will sense the continuity and weight of it all.  This book will be long, though, even without doing that.  The rest of this book will speak for itself on the subject of alienation, and by the time the reader has finished he will have had ample opportunity to observe the many expressions of alienation.  The chapter-headings themselves point toward the relevance of alienation to socialist thought:  “Continuities from Medieval Values…  “The intellectual and the Have-Nots”… “European Exportation of Alienation”… “The Focus on Attack”… “Rejection of Bourgeois Liberalism”… “Relativism as a Means of Attack”… “The Worldview of the Left:  A Perspective From Down Under”… “Theories of Exploitation”…and the like.

In Understanding the Modern Predicament I made a systematic analysis of the causes and consequences the alienation that I won't want to repeat here. The chapters of that book that pertain to such an overall understanding are valuable as an underpinning for our discussion of socialist thought.

In the rest of this chapter I will be content to discuss a number of separate points that will allow me to share the information I have gathered through reading socialist literature. They will supplement my discussion in Understanding the Modern Predicament and will begin to create a mosaic that will bring together the various threads for the reader who has not studied that book.

1. Among those who are not thoroughly familiar with socialism or who are preoccupied with the specific economic and ideological content of socialism's appeal to the have-nots, there is a naive impression that socialism is the ideology of the poor. It comes as a surprise to such a person that socialist thinkers have virtually all come from the middle class or higher. These thinkers have not themselves been proletarians, even though they have presumed to speak for the proletariat.  Norman Thomas says "the leaders in the development of socialism were almost all rebels from the upper and intellectual classes."2

It is tempting to think that in nineteenth century Russia the revolutionary socialist movement arose among the peasants. Nothing, however, could, be further from what actually occurred. The alienated intelligentsia sprang from the nobility, the clergy and the rising middle class. In Sons Against Fathers, E. Lampert says that in the 1860s many of the leaders among the radicals were "sons of the clergy, who spent their early years in a milieu where Orthodoxy was as much a fact as were climate and history."3

If we take the main personalities in socialist history as reflected by the table of contents of Fried and Sanders' Socialist Thought, and if we then look up these men in Collier's Encyclopaedia, here is what we find about their origins:

Jean Jacques Rousseau. "The Rousseaus were watchmakers and substantial citizens."                                            "Gracchus" Babeuf.  A land surveyor.

Claude Henri Saint-Simon.  “At the height of Jacobin power, he formally abdicated his noble name and titles.”

Charles Fourier.  “The son of a prosperous cloth merchant.”

Robert Owen.  Although he started at a relatively low level as an apprentice draper, he became a wealthy businessman.

Pierre Joseph Proudhon.  He was one of the few whose origins coincided with the popular image of socialists.  He was born “of a poor labouring family.”

Karl Marx.  “His father was a Jewish lawyer.”  When he was seventeen he “entered the University of Bonn to study law.”

Friedrich Engels.  “The son of a prosperous and conservative textile manufacturer.”

Michael Bakunin.  “Born in 1814 into a family of the Russian minor landed nobility….”

Peter Kropotkin.  “He was born in Moscow on December 9, 1842, a descendant of a princely family.  Kropotkin was educated at home and at the Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg.”

Georges Sorel.  Sorel was born at Cherbourg, France, on November 2, 1874, of a substantial, middle-class family.”

Ferdinand Lassalle.  “The son of a Jewish merchant.”4

Leon Trotsky.  In his autobiography, My Life, Trotsky downplays his early years as “the grayish childhood of a lower-middle-class family,” but this impression is contradicted by what he tells us about specifics.  He refers, for example, to his family’s having had a cook and a maid.  His father cultivated 650 acres, had herds of cattle and of horses, and had buildings that featured a machine-shop, servants’ quarters, a stable, a chicken house, and the like.  The children took music lessons.  Later, “the October Revolution found my father a very prosperous man.”5

2.  Most people probably don’t associate National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy with intellectuals.  The popular image is, however, a misconception that leads to the erroneous conclusion that the Left has been intellectually based while the totalitarian Right has not.  This in turn bolsters the image that the two are opposite, when actually they have much in common.

            In The Socialist Revolution, Richard Vetterli and William E. Fort, Jr., say about Nazism that Germany's intellectual community had long since prepared the German people and German youth for the acceptance of some from of militant socialism.”  They quote from William Kornhauser the amazing fact that "one fourth of the SS elite had previously received the doctorate."  From William Shirer they cite the fact that "by 1932, the majority of students seemed to be enthusiastic for Hitler."  They indicate that public opinion in Germany even before World War I was "systematically prepared by historians and publicists for anti-westernism."  Kornhauser is quoted by them to the effect that "The philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the political theory of Carl Schmitt, the theology of Karl Barth -- all these convinced the German intellectuals that mankind had reached a decisive turning point, an unprecedented crisis, into which liberalism had led man."

Vetterli and Fort include a significant passage that they say was written by Peter Viereck "at the height of Hitler's power" and that observes that "most of these leading Nazi ideologists (except for the brilliant George circle) may justly be denied the status of first-class thinkers. But neither do they deserve to be dismissed with the haughty contempt usually accorded them in America. Rather, these German word-warriors (like Langbehn, Lagarde, Eckart, Gottfried, Feder, Darre, Ernest Krieck, Count Reventlow, Funk, Goebbels, Rosenberg) generally have a status midway in-between the first and the third rate…After 1933 many of them repented. Many courageously strode to torture and prison... But too late!!! Many of the most talented German intellectuals (including Blunek, Grimm, Ludwig Klages, Krieck, Reventlow and the rest) still support Hitler through the worst."

Some of these intellectual influences pertained to the Nazi's organization of the economy. Vetterli and Fort say that Walter Rathenau profoundly influenced German economic thinking, and that he, "perhaps more than any other socialist intellectual, determined the views of the generation which grew up in Germany during and immediately after World War I.”  They say that some of the men most closely associated with Rathenau "later became the backbone staff of Goering’s Five Year Plan Administration.”6

In Italy, the fascists were, according to Lichtheim in his A Short History of Socialism, “a radical nationalist movement of the intelligentsia."  Benedetto Croce was one of the leading thinkers in Italy, and Vetterli and Fort tell us "believed that Fascism had justified itself by overcoming Italian indifferences to politics and by reviving national morale."  They say that "the philosopher Pareto also praised the new dictatorship" and that "other top Fascists, such as well-known intellectuals Paolo Boldrin, Rodolfo Vagliasindi, and Count Pier-Ludovico Occhini, were holders of the PhD, and had published extensively. Another, Guglielmo Marconi, was a recipient of numerous honorary degrees and had been awarded the Nobel Prize." They quote Professor Alfred Rocco as having written that "for Fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends."  They speak of Giovanni Gentile as a "neo-Hegelian phi1osopher and one of the Fascist movement’s top intellectuals." Later they mention Mario Palmieri as also having been a Fascist intellectual.

 3. Marxist ideology has acknowledged the phenomenon of the alienation of the intellectual, though that ideology necessarily gives it a different interpretation than I do. John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset write that "the basic contradiction of post-industrial society -- the Marxist-Hegelian sense of contradiction -- may well turn out to be, not the growth of a manual working class that is potentially alienated, which Marx saw as the central contradiction of the nineteenth century capitalist system, but the increase of an inherently alienated new leading stratum, namely the intellectuals."8   This recognizes the existence of the alienation, its magnitude and duration, and the challenge it has posed to the predominant society.

 4. Chapter 11 in Understanding the Modern Predicament analyzed the causes of the alienation. Chapter 9, which dealt with existential problems within a commercial culture, should also be understood as relating to the causes. One of the causes is what I have called "displacement." This refers to the fact that the modern intellectual has been displaced by the acting man of commerce and industry. The intellectual has had no settled, satisfactory place; he has struggled in an on-going rivalry for the power and status that he feels he deserves.

            Many passages in socialist writing relate to the displacement. David Caute, for example, says in The Left in Europe Since 1789 that the various movements of the Left have often received their theory and leadership from intellectuals.  He refers to the intelligentsia as "a group which combines a high educational level with a relative lack of social integration."9 (Emphasis added.)

In part, the displacement shows a lack of economic integration. The demand for the product produced by "men of words" is often not high enough to reward those products well, in part because of the large numbers of such people. An interesting illustration is given by Lewis S. Feuer, who points out that "England in the 1880s was already producing a surplus of intellectuals that the economy could not absorb." He refers to a passage by William Clarke in the first Fabian Essays in which Clark spoke of an "intellectual proletariat." Clarke said that "fifty years ago you could have gathered all the press writers of London into a single moderate sized room. Today all told they number ten thousand...You see at once that it is impossible for all these men to earn a living... The result is that the keenest and most dangerous discontent comes from the educated classes, who are leading the Socialist masses all over Europe."

            I do not, however believe that the struggle for a good living should be thought of as standing alone.  In addition, the intellectuals are morally offended, and they feel that they are being denied the power, prestige and influence that is their due. These dimensions are apparent in Feuer's later observation about "a vast corps of literary and aesthetic intellectuals without high competence or talents, often semi-educated, but who nonetheless feel themselves as most properly qualified (in Shelley's phrase) to be the legislators or mankind. Society, they feel, is not proffering the places they merit."10

            The Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises was stalwartly pro-capitalist. He praised the market economy for the "consumer sovereignty" that is inherent in it. Those who advocate a "free society" in the classical liberal sense will applaud the market system in part because of the consumer choice it allows. It is worth noticing that this involves a democracy of choice, which is very much at odds with the system of rewards an intellectual almost necessarily prefers. The intellectual is convinced that he himself -- as a person who is sensitive, discerning, conscientious and capable -- has intrinsic merit. Beyond that, he feels that his vital concerns and work products are also of imperative value, whether many other people think so or not. If we appreciate the enormous value of spiritual and intellectual life, we will realize that he is often correct in this feeling. But this does not suggest that people in general, as they decide what to buy and not to buy, will reward any given intellectual, or even intellectuals as a group. In my own case, I write classical liberal philosophy for which there has been virtually no market. To the extent there are classical liberals in our society, and in a broad sense there are many, they devote themselves to other things and not to the serious reading of abstract ideas. This does not mean that there is no value in what I write, but it does mean that years of thought and effort bear no inevitable relationship to recognition and reward. It would be foolish to think that this not a potent source of grievance on the part of intellectuals. In a market system, anything that does not appeal to someone else's economic demand becomes a private indulgence, a form of personal consumption that has costs but that produces no income. The result is that many valuable, even essential, people and things are minimized. At least this is true about the direct operation of the market, although in a broader context the enormous productivity and affluence a market system brings about creates a setting in which there is more support for intellectual and aesthetic pursuits than has existed before. The modern intellectual, however, takes this broader support for granted as an entitlement (just as he takes our giant universities for granted) and continues to be sensitive to what he sees as a general lack of appreciation and reward.

            This is why classical liberalism, as the philosophy of an individualistic, market-centered society, needs to be deeply concerned about the spiritual and intellectual elevation of bourgeois life. A bourgeois society cannot be complete without an elevating leadership by an appropriate intellectual "clerisy," to use the word preferred by Coleridge and John Stuart Mill. The greatest tragedy produced by the fact of intellectual alienation is that the flight of the intellectual has deprived modern civilization of an essential element. There are dimensions of aesthetics, of poetry, of broad vision and sensibility, that must be part of a bourgeois society if it is to fulfill the best that is in people and is to avoid incurring perpetual loathing. The blame for the failure in this area in the modern age lies about equally with the average person, in his lack of interest and awareness, and with the intellectual, in the inappropriateness of his alienated response.

            The intellectual's grievance with the market is really a grievance with other people. It would be a grievance even if they were all to become intellectuals. They are preoccupied with their own lives and do not have the time or sensibility to "value him for his own sake."  If his own internal consciousness, his radical solitude, is a shrine, it is he himself, and not others, who must be the worshiper. Even if the others were all fellow intellectuals (which is something that will never happen, as I see human nature), he could not anticipate that they would worship at his shrine, since each of those others would have his own. An exception occurs when a thinker is able to develop a strong group of disciples. But all thinkers ought not to expect this as their due, and there is room for doubt about whether discipleship has much real value anyway.

            Not only will most people not value the intellectual for his own sake; often they won't even buy what he produces. This isn't the market's doing; the reason for it lies in their having their own tastes and interests. This can't be remedied by getting away from a market economy unless doing so provides the means either to remake peoples' tastes or to force their attention. This is something we will need to keep in mind later when we discuss the desire many intellectuals have to use socialism or revolution as a way to remold mankind in their own image.

            There is an analogy to the Marxists' point about "the alienation of people from their work." This use of the word "alienation" pertains to the separation that exists between work-for-its-own-sake and work-for-a-saleable product. The point that Marxists make is that a market system causes substitution, for the enjoyment of work for its own sake, of a secondary, or "false," set of values.   Instead of immersing themselves in work for the sheer enjoyment of creativity, people look ahead to what they will receive in payment. The same split is seen in the difference between a college student's studying a subject for its own sake and his studying for the grade that he hopes to make.  The concern over the grade involves the substitution of a more secondary, mediocre, but tangible, set of values.

            What the Marxists fail to see, or disregard because they think they have a better alternative, is that the problem arises because of the inescapable fact that other people are involved. Exquisite, hand-carved cabinets of the type that give great job satisfaction for the carver can be made for the rich, but the average person must obtain less expensive, more functional cabinets, which can only be made generally available through mass production. No society can assure everyone meaningful, satisfying work unless it can force consumers to abandon their desire for cheap goods. The situation with a student's grades similarly reflects the realities of a world of people: other people want to have an easy way to judge the work a student has done; in addition, parents and educators don't find that pure intellectual satisfaction is enough to motivate many young people. A more tangible value system is introduced that is spiritually inferior but more effective.

            This universal accommodation of everyone's genuineness to secondary, indirect values involves considerable loss on at least one side of the ledger. The alienated intellectual and the socialist have hit upon legitimate concerns. This is true, even though the losses are more than made up for on the other side of the ledger. This came to mind this past summer while I was coaching a ten year old boys' baseball team. I was very fond of the boys, but there were times when I valued each boy for what he could produce: a hit, a pitch delivered hard over the plate, or a straight throw to first base. This, it seemed to me, is as it should be, despite the socialists' protests to the contrary. It atrophies life to want it always to be an accepting, caressing, non-judgmental womb. We measure ourselves by standards that relate to the social context in which we find ourselves (in this case, the aspirations of everyone connected with the team), when we come to expect objective performance.

            Socialist literature has often expressed the complaint against this dichotomy in human life. Adam Ulam observes that there may be a sociological explanation for why intellectuals have not liked capitalism: "the system deprecates the importance of the intellectual class, and it has the tendency to evaluate achievement in pragmatic business-like terms."11

            Werner Sombart migrated through several forms of anti-capitalist alienation. He was first a leading member of the German Historical School, then a Marxist, then a devout supporter of Hitler. He articulated the socialist concern especially well in 1937 during his Nazi phase when he complained about "the exclusive acceptance of money value” in a market system and said that "all other values are, through a refined process of disapproval, divested of their power to command recognition, or they merely serve as a means of achieving riches. An intellectual person obtains neither standing nor approval in society until he has a large income. A poet, a composer, a sculptor, a painter, a physician, a lawyer are regarded as insignificant until they can prove the contrary through a large tax bill; in other words, until they can show 'results.' But to achieve results at present means to be recognized by a large number of persons who are solvent and can, therefore, pay a high price. In all avenues of life results are measured by the amount of income received. The declining scale is as follows: from spiritual value to performance value, from performance value to result value, from result value to value of visible result, from value of visible result to value capable of being coined."

            Sombart showed the importance he attached to this when he said that "the most singular mark of the economic age is that wealth which has its origin in the counting-house carries no stain, and that the representatives of economics, the businessman, as such, enjoy the respect of the people and wield the power in the state."12 (Emphasis added)  This is reminiscent of Thomas Carlyle's vigorous complaints about everything's being reduced to a "cash nexus."

            Joseph Goebbels thought the ideal solution to the intellectual's paradox was provided by national socialism: "How could the German artist not feel sheltered in this state! Socially secure, economically improved, esteemed by society, he can now serve his great plans in peace and without the bitterest cares for his livelihood. He again has a people that awaits his call."13

            5. Another of the causes of the alienation I discussed in Understanding the ModernPredicament was the role of envy, with the associated desire to possess power. This is a cause that is closely related to the displacement.

            Joseph Schumpeter spoke of Marxism as having stated "with unsurpassed force that feeling of being thwarted and ill treated which is the auto-therapeutic attitude of the unsuccessful many."14 He felt that capitalism is unable to create an emotional attachment in its people, and that in the absence of such an attachment the frustrations of everyday life build up to a "hostile impulse" that becomes a "permanent constituent of our psychic setup."

            Feuer says that to rule has been “the frustration of their will to rule has been the deepest unconscious source of intellectuals' alienation." He says that they felt themselves an elite that has been "entitled to rule" in place of business, legal, military or even popularly elected elites. The subject isn’t a simple one with Feuer, however, since he sees a variety of motives at work within the intellectual. The intellectual is altruistic and self-sacrificing while at the same time yearning to merge "in an alternating dominance and submission, with the physical power of the people." Depending upon circumstances, this merger can be with the peasants, the proletariat, minority races, backward countries, or any other have-not group.

            Feuer's writing shows the relationship among several factors: displacement, personal envy, the quest for power, the alliance with unassimilated elements, and elitism. These are all parts of the same phenomenon even though we can separate them for discussion. 

            Temperament is another aspect closely tied to displacement and envy. The intellectual tends to be the sort of personality who, instead throwing himself unreservedly into any activity, stands aside as an observer even while he appears to be actively involved. It would be an interesting empirical study to compare groups of "intellectuals" and "acting men" on how successfully they participated in childhood team sports. There seems be a pattern that forces those who are less capable at sports, whether because of temperament or sheer lack of physical ability, to drop out and shift their efforts to other things. Feuer comments how remarkable it is that such intellectuals as Shaw and Einstein "had similar traits of personal incapacity to cope with a competitive world." This has led, he says, to their estrangement from other people. It is an easy jump from this to alienated political ideology, as we see from Kingsley Amis' comments in one of the Fabian tracts when he refers to political writing and activism as "a kind of self-administered therapy for personal difficulties rather than as a contribution towards the reform of society -- this I think is an important key to the whole intellectual approach to politics." He say that those who love what is "established and customary" move toward the right; those who hate it move toward the left.15

            It would be a mistake to think that the rejection of everyday life with its gregarious activity, and the intellectuals' withdrawal into self, are just a matter of personality preference. The intellectual sincerely rejects the vacuity of what in Understanding the Modern Predicament I referred it as “the extroverted outer flow." Modern intellectuals have complained constantly about this emptiness. John Stuart Mill was extremely unhappy with the intellectual mediocrity of the rising middle class in nineteenth century England. Ralph Waldo Emerson explained that men of sensibility "fly for refuge to the world of ideas" when they find the world too meaningless and false. Since this is a potent substantive cause of the alienation, we should expect to find the complaint voiced in socialist literature. It appears in Rosa Luxemberg's comment in 1917 that "this losing oneself complete in the banalities of daily life is something that I generally cannot understand or endure."16  Harold Laski complained to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., about the United States that "it would be a real help to me if I could discover in this country some widespread and continuous passion for intellectual effort. I suppose you don't have the opportunity to encounter the lighthearted ignorance which appalls me."17

            A fair assessment of the problem of emptiness calls for some additional observations, though, that are not flattering to the alienated intellectual. The affluence of the modern age has made vast resources available to the intellectual. At the same time, the number of intellectuals has increased. If instead of preoccupying themselves with alienation these intellectuals had gone ahead to produce, by their own efforts and among themselves, the magnificent renaissance that was possible, most of the pain that has come to them from vacuity would have evaporated, even if great masses of people remained indifferent. An emptiness certainly existed. It has been created by the rise of average humanity, the materialistic preoccupations of the so-called "bourgeoisie," and the trivialities of the "extroverted outer flow." But intellectuals have been significantly at fault themselves. They have perpetuated the emptiness by their own failure to transcend it; and they have contributed their own ingredient to the emptiness by setting its tone through injecting a non-humanistic neurotic quality into it. We see this neurosis in a large part of modern art, music and literature. It appears not just in alienated expressions, but also in many forms of popular culture, which are strongly influenced by the intellectuals' orientation.

            6.  Intellectuals often think of socialism as a way to open the door for intellectuality. Edward Bellamy envisioned a society in which the highest recognition would go to intellectuals. Salvador Allende talked about Communism in Chile as "ensuring for its intellectuals and artists conditions in which their works will express a true cultural renaissance."18 By this time in the twentieth century, however, there is a healthy scepticism on this score because of the disillusioning experience that intellectuals have had with socialism as it has actually been practiced. This disillusionment is apparent in Tamara Deutscher's article in The Socialist Register 1978 when she writes of "the deeply felt isolation of the intellectual in a society of the Soviet type."  She tells specifically that "the highly sophisticated dissident philosophers of the so-called Budapest School... have left Hungary," and that other dissident intellectuals have a choice either of staying "on the margin of society" or of joining a mass of sychophants. She speaks of an "inertia of fear" among dissident intellectuals in the Soviet Union because of the "relentless persecution by the state."19

            Socialists have been predisposed to ignore such lessons and even now have only partly learned them. One of the enormities of the twentieth century has been the extent to which the world's intellectuals have been oblivious to the abuses within the Soviet Union and Communist China. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is correct in pointing out that the "Western socialists who waited until 1961 to feel 'ashamed of being socialists side by side with the Soviet Union' could very well have come to that conclusion some forty or forty-five years earlier. At that time, Russian Communists were already destroying Russian socialists. But nobody groans when another man's tooth aches."20

            The problem of the role of intellect in a collectivist society should be considered a perpetual one by those who think about socialism. The intellectual will at all times and places be in the minority. His role is accordingly contingent upon factors that are often out of his control. We recall Eric Hoffer's observations in The True Believer about how the idealist is shunted aside as a revolution matures. Robespierre and Trotsky learned this lesson through bitter experience.

            Chapter 24 will discuss an underlying premise of socialist thought I have variously called "the assumption of continuity" or "of regularity." An idealist's call for a collectivist society almost necessarily involves a supposition that the resulting society will continue his own values and purposes. He counts on its giving a significant role, often the places of top leadership, to men like himself; and he assumes that it will carry out the social values he finds desirable. This is, of course, quite a naive supposition. It is an act of faith.

            We can imagine what a shock it is to a good many alienated Western artists to find, as Rudi Supek tells us, that "an extremely ferocious campaign is being waged in some socialist countries today against abstract art as the last, 'most radical,' and most distorted, expression of bourgeois decadency in art."2l Supek is not talking about Hitler's artistic tastes, but about avowedly leftist societies to which the alienated artists of the twentieth century have looked with great anticipation.

            [Note in 2003: In the above passages I have summarized the causes of the alienation as I analyzed them in Understanding the Modern Predicament.  As I have prepared that book for inclusion on my Web site, however, I have felt it necessary to add mention of the alienation that various ethnic groups felt that migrated to the United States in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Most especially, a great many Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe have taken part in the Left, including in the alienation that has been so much a part of leftist thinking.  It is likely that their alienation stems in major part from the same causes I have analyzed in my earlier book and in this chapter; but there may be features in the history of those individuals and the culture from which they came that need to be understood specifically.  I am not sufficiently versed in that history or culture to comment on the origins of their ideology and sentiment.]

 

 

NOTES

 

1.      The passage quoted is from Dwight Murphey’s Understanding the Modern Predicament (Washington: University Press of America, 1982) pp. 190-200.

2.      Norman Thomas, Socialism Re-Examined (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 34.

3.      E. Lampert, Sons Against Fathers  (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 66.

4.      Collier’s Encyclopedia (New York:  Macmillan Educational Corporation, 1979).  Rousseau:  Vol. 20,  p. 243.  Babeuf:  Vol. 3, p. 421.  Saint-Simon:  Vol. 20, p. 369.  Fourier:  Vol. 10, p. 238.  Owen:  Vol. 18, p. 260.  Proudhon:  Vol. 19, p. 434.  Marx:  Vol. 15, p. 468.  Engels:  Vol. 9, p. 145.  Bakunin:  Vol. 3, p. 470.  Kropotkin:  Vol. 14, p. 186.  Sorel:  Vol. 21, p. 218.  Lassalle:  Vol. 14, p. 334.

5.       Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York:  Grossett & Dunlap, 1960), pp. 1-41.

6.      Richard Vetterli and William E. Fort, Jr., The Socialist Revolution (Los Angeles:  Clute International Corporation, 1968), pp.  87, 88, 94, 91, 56, 57, 28, 30, 43.

7.      George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 210.

8.      John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset, Failure of a Dream?  Essays in the History of American Socialism (Garden City:  Anchor Press, 1974), p. 61.

9.      David Caute, The Left in Europe Since 1789 (New York:  McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 229.

10.  Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals (Garden City:  Anchor Books, 1969), p. 66, 226-7, 2, 51.

11.  Adam B. Ulam, Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 102-3.

12.   Werner Sombart, A New Social Philosophy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 22-3.

13.  George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1966), p. 158.

14.  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2d ed. (New York:  Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 6, 145.

15.  Kingsley Amis, Socialism and the Intellectuals (London: The Fabian Society, 1957), p. 4.

16.  Trotsky, My Life, p. 582.

17.  Mark DeWolfe Howe (ed.), Holmes-Laski Letters (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 64.

18.  Salvador Allende, Chile’s Road to Socialism (Middlesex, England: Penquin Books, 1973), p. 64.

19.  Ralph Miliband and John Saville, ed.s, The Socialist Register 1978 (London: The Merlin Press, 1978, article by Tamara Deutscher entitled “Voices of Dissent”:  pp. 34, 35, 38.

20.  Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago Three  (New York: Perennial Library, 1978), p. 344.

21.  Article by Rudi Supek, “Freedom and Polydeterminism in Cultural Criticism,” in Socialist Humanism, Erich Fromm, ed. (Garden City:  Anchor Books, 1965), p. 295.