[This is Chapter Thirteen of Murphey’s book Socialist Thought.]

 

 

Chapter 13

 

THE ENVIRONMENTALIST ASSUMPTION

 

The central concept in the Left's ideological perspective is the view that many millions of people, even in advanced civilization, are trapped deterministically by the pressures of life or of society.  This is logically prior to the exploitation theories, for which it serves as a foundation. In the usual order of analysis, it should be considered first.  I have reversed the order so that the tangible practicality of the exploitation theories could provide a backdrop that would give the reader an immediate sense of the specific significance of the more amorphous concept of entrapment.

In this chapter we will see the ways the entrapment concept has been expressed within socialist writing. Before we survey the literature, however, it will be useful to summarize the discussion of the "environmentalist assumption" which appears in my Burkean Conservatism and Classical Liberalism, beginning at page 162:

Summary of my earlier analysis:  A Burkean conservative believes that a person's environment is considerably less important in its impact upon him than is the person's relationship to God.  The Burkean accordingly considers that both the Left and classical liberalism, as varying types of rationalistic and secular thought, share an assumption that people are mainly, if not, entirely, the creatures of the environmental influences upon them.

So far as it goes, the Burkean's view on this is correct.  Any secularist will be inclined to say that the environment [by which I mean the total circumstances of a person’s life, which is a different use of the word “environment” than has become customary since the advent of the ecology movement] has a major impact on the individual and on mankind in general.  But this shouldn't obscure the point that classical liberalism and the Left disagree sharply about the specific application of the environmentalist perspective. They are divided so sharply, in fact, that considerable insight can be gained into each philosophy by understanding its views on this point. They disagree in three separate but interdependent ways:

Their first point of disagreement is about the amount of energy and self-starting motivation most people bring to life. The Left tends strongly to see the individual's situation and behavior as determined by the "inputs" he receives from his environment. The classical liberal, on the other hand, believes the individual is not primarily a passive receptor -- but instead contributes significantly to the process by his own volition, intelligence and energy. To the Left, a great many individuals are inert, trapped and consequently exploited; to the classical liberal, the individual is an active manipulator of life in his own right. This difference could be one simply of degree, but innumerable conversations over the years have convinced me that the gulf is quite wide, reflecting a polarization of views about this point.

Before we leave this first aspect, it is worth noting that the Left's imputation of inertia to so much of humanity is inconsistent with its faith in Rousseau's view that people are spontaneously creative, if only other people don't put barriers in their way by discouragements, frustrations and sources of boredom.  Rousseau's perspective appears in Emile, his book on education, which has been the foundation for the modern "progressive" and "unstructured" philosophy of education. Rousseau's optimism about human nature leads into and justifies moral relativism and permissiveness; it also provides the basis for a belief in possible utopias.

This optimism is contradicted when the Left comes to assess, for example, the ability of an employed West Virginia coal miner or a welfare recipient to show some initiative. Here, the Left will invariably argue that such a person is the pawn of forces he cannot escape. The result is that the Left insists we not expect anything from him. It is surprising to see this view side-by-side with Rousseau's belief in spontaneous creativity, but we should remember that the Left's ideology has grown up as a superstructure to cover the alienation of the intellectual from the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals' alliance with the have-nots. Each of the contradictory views about the capability of people is ideologically useful to the tactical position of the Left, since each gives rise to an anti-bourgeois position.

The second point of disagreement has to do with whether a moral imperative relating to individual capability should precisely be a part of each person's social environment.

The critic of classical liberalism argues that "your individualism heartlessly demands that each person 'pull himself up by his own bootstraps.'"  He believes the classical liberal is expecting the individual to do it all by himself, entirely on his own motion.  But this is a mistaken assessment of what the classical liberal is saying.  It is true that the classical liberal does posit a substantial amount of energy in the individual.  But when an individual "pulls on his own bootstraps" in a classical liberal society, he is hardly doing it entirely on his own. In such a society a social consensus on an ethic of self- reliance, responsibility, effort and initiative is precisely a part of the individual's social environment.  This consensus is impressed upon him from birth by his parents, school, church and peers.  He doesn't produce it, but is led by it to exercise his own faculties.  When the individual internalizes this ethic, it becomes the basis for his self-discipline and a part of his motive-power.

The classical liberal asserts that a "moral imperative" to capability and self-reliance is absolutely necessary for a free society.  But the Left, for its part, attacks such an ethic. The Left isolates the ethic of self-reliance by using a culturally relativistic method to categorize it as "Puritanic" or "bourgeois." This assault on an ethic of responsibility reflects, again, the Left's drive to undercut bourgeois life. The result is that the Left disagrees profoundly with classical liberalism about what the content of the ethical environment of the individual is to be. The Left favors ethical inputs that will stress the individual's support for collective action, such as when it urges an ethic of "social responsibility"; but it opposes the ethic suitable for an individualistic society.

The third point of disagreement relates to the opposing perspectives of the general environment and its effect on the individual. The Left considers the environment monolithic, entrapping, overpowering in its compelling sweep. Classical liberalism, though, sees the individual’s environment -- especially in advanced civilization -- as pluralistic, rich in the diversity of its suggestions. To the classical liberal view, the individual (especially if he brings his own vitality to the situation and he is impressed by society with an imperative toward doing so) can do a great deal to select his own environment and its continuing influence upon himself.  Every time he takes a class or visits a library he is making an extended environment available to himself that can open new vistas for him.  The "environment" in this sense is far from entrapping.

In all three points of difference, we see that classical liberalism affirms the ability of people to be free in a civilization such as ours, and that the Left holds instead to theories of entrapment, determinism and exploitation that deny the possibility of freedom in the absence of what they see as the helping hand of collectivism. This explains why the Left sees itself as libertarian, while classical liberalism views the Left as destructive of freedom.

Socialist writing includes frequent expression of the Left's perspective on each of these three points. The examples I will give are by no means exhaustive, but are representative:

1. The individual's lack of vitality.  Brian Abel-Smith's Fabian Tract Freedom in the Welfare State centers its argument on the view that most people lack capability and need help in virtually every area of life.  Speaking of the plight of the "dependent," he says "there has been a long history of exploitation of the young, the sick, the aged, the senile, the mentally ill and the subnormal in private profit institutions."  He goes on to say that there is a "limited ability (on the part of) any ordinary consumer to understand what he is buying" and this leads him to the conclusion that "public intervention is needed to prevent the consumer being sold what he does not want.  And it is no good talking about freedom of choice if people have neither the money nor the knowledge to exercise it."  In the same vein, he later says that "one of the most neglected fields today is that of advice on job selection."  And then he says "we must protect children from parents who fail to see the importance of education for their children's future."l The image he creates of humanity, even in an advanced society such as Britain’s, is one of obtuseness and inertia.

The lack of vitality will be apparent from everything else I will quote relating to the other two points, but first it is worth noticing what Daniel Bell has said about Communist thought:  "The individual, central to the liberal theory of a market society, was for the Bolshevik a helpless entity.”2

2. Opposition to an ethic of self-reliance; blaming "society" for misconduct and dependency.  In countless ways, socialist authors have removed moral expectation from the individual and shifted blame to his broader environment.

Speaking of Robert Owen's views, Thomas Kirkup said that "the chief points in this philosophy were that man's character is made not by him but for him; that it has been formed by circumstances over which he had no control; that he is not a proper subject either of praise or blame."3

Rousseau wrote that "all wickedness comes from weakness."  Later he added that "evil in general can only spring from disorder."4  As with all of Rousseau's writing, reverberations have continued to the present day.  In an essay by Danilo Dolci, winner of the Lenin Peace Prize in 1959, for example, it is said that the "old" concept of "sin" has given way to a "new" concept of "insufficiency."5 (To the extent that there is sincerity behind the Soviet Union's incarceration of dissidents in mental wards, we can see the conceptual justification right here.)

Marxism-Leninism translates the broader blaming of "society" into the dialectical language of class struggle.  Lenin wrote that "the fundamental social cause of excesses which consist in violating the rules of social life is the exploitation of the masses, their want and their poverty."6

This perspective arises in part from the desire by alienated intellectuals to negate what they see as a "bourgeois" ethic. It arises also, however, from the rationale of pooling, since it is thought that the pooling of resources, by taking away the insecurities of human life, will remove the motives for misconduct. We are going back 2500 years when we read the comments to this effect by the character Praxagora in Aristophanes' delightful spoof on socialist thought: "All pressure from want will be o’er. Now each will have all that a man can desire, cakes, barley-leaves, chestnuts, abundant attire, wine garlands, and fish; then why should he wish the wealth he has gotten by fraud to retain?"7

A classical liberal sees moral weakness as one of the roots of poverty. A socialist denies this. George Bernard Shaw ridiculed the idea when he wrote of "some inconsiderate person (who) repeats like a parrot that if you gave everybody the same money, before a year was out you would have rich and poor again just as before."8 I remember that my grandfather used to say that "if you were to redistribute all the property equally in Palmer Lake, within a short time I would be well off again and the folks who are 'winos' down in Murria's Bar would be down there again." One of the fascinating things about the social ideologies is that an observation that seems entirely reasonable to one person will seem totally unreasonable to another.

3. A monolithic, deterministic view of the environment.  To the Left, the setting in which the individual finds himself is so solid, so compelling, that he has little power against it.  Determinism sweeps over him, depriving him of all meaningful volition.  Nor can the individual select from among the inputs he receives from his environment.

Frederick Engels wrote that "under the brutal and brutalizing treatment of the bourgeoisie, the working man becomes precisely as much a thing without volition as water, and is subject to the laws of nature with precisely the same necessity."9  This is, of course, totally opposite to the views of Cobden and Bright, both classical liberals, who lived during the same period in England.

Adam Schaff summarizes the Marxist view as being that the individual "is -- since the moment of birth -- shaped by society and is its product, physically and spiritually... What will be of decisive importance is not moral self-improvement... The emphasis is shifted to society and to the material existence shaping its development."10

B. F. Skinner presents the deterministic view when he argues that "in the traditional view, a person is free. He is autonomous in the sense that his behavior is uncaused. He can therefore be held responsible for what he does and justly punished if he offends. That view, together with its associated practices, must be re-examined when a scientific analysis reveals unsuspected controlling relations between behavior and environment."  This reductionism leads him to a very common socialist attitude: to want to restructure mankind through a rationalistic manipulation of the social environment. "We need," he says, "to design contingencies under which students acquire behavior useful to them and their culture... The application of a science of behavior to the design of a culture...."11

All of this, of course, relates to the socialist critique of a liberal individualistic society, since the individual will there be considered trapped by a monolithic social environment.  Fried and Sanders accordingly can say that "laissez-faire... meant a new kind of servitude for the thousands of men, women and children who spent most of their waking hours in these factories."12

NOTES

1. Brian Abel-Smith, Freedom in the Welfare State (Fabian Tract 353, 1965), pp. 5, 7, 13, 15.

2. Article by Daniel Bell in Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism, John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.s), (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974), p. 104.

3. Thomas Kirkup, History of Socialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), p. 62.

4. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile (New York:  J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd, 1911), pp. 33, 244.

5. Article by Danilo Dolci, “Reflections on Planning and Groups, Decentralization and Planning,” Socialist Humanism, Erich Fromm (ed.) (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), p. 422.

6. The Lenin Reader, Stefan Possony (ed.) (Chicago:  Henry Regnery Co., 1966), p. 202.

7. Joseph B. Gittler, Social Thought Among the Early Greeks (Athens, Ga.: The University of Georgia Press, 1941), pp. 151, 152.

8. George Bernard Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism (New York: Brentano’s Publishers, 1928), p. 69.

9. Frederick Engels, The Condition of Working Class in England in 1844 (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1952), pp. 134, 135.

10. Article by Adam Schaff, “Marxism and the Philosophy of Man,” Socialist Humanism, Erich Fromm (ed.) (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 144, 145.

11. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), pp. 17, 149, 150.

12. Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders (ed.s), Socialist Thought (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1964), p. 3.