[This is Chapter Sixteen of Murphey’s book Socialist Thought.]

 

 

Chapter 16

VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE

            The worldview each of the major philosophies entertains about people and their fundamental traits is highly influential in the formation of the philosophy's other concepts.

            Many Burkean conservatives see man as a fallen creature, touched profoundly by "human depravity."  Man is a sinner, subject to the weaknesses of the flesh and the fallibilities of human will and intellect. This view of man understandably leads to the Burkeans' desire to "put a lid on" the depraved tendencies of mankind by integrating people tightly into an organic whole.  A strong religion, a powerful state and the ties of tradition and faith all serve to direct an otherwise miscreant humanity.

            Classical liberals hold generally to a mixed view of human nature, seeing a combination of good and bad, capability and weakness. The goodness and strength lead, then to the "vitalist perspective" that posits that the vital energies of millions of people acting voluntarily can be counted upon to produce a high level of well-being.

The evil and weakness, on the other hand, lead to recognition of the need for the Rule of Law, restraints upon the potential abuse of all forms of power, and a ubiquitous ethical consensus.

            Socialist thought is varied in its view of human nature, as we will see.  But there is one very powerful tradition that emanates from Jean Jacques Rousseau and that takes a strongly optimistic view of the altruistic brotherliness of people in general.  It holds that if ever the warping effects of  materialism and greed, brought on by private property and a competitive nexus, can be done away with, humanity can return to an "original human nature" that was group-oriented and loving.

            Not all socialists have shared this view of human, but it has served as the ideal foundation for at least one very important type of ideological response by alienated intellectuals to their alienation from bourgeois society.  It does this in the following ways:

            (1) It lends itself easily to utopianism.  A perfected society is seen as both possible and workable.  All that needs to be done is to root out the warping influences that currently deprive mankind of its appropriate form. This belief in a socialist utopia of one kind or another has been held by several important thinkers and schools within socialist thought: it underlay much of the thinking of the Russian revolutionaries, such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Chernyshevsky; it is perhaps the most important underpinning of left-wing anarchism; it was a mainstay of much of the counter-cultural thinking within the New Left; and even though Karl Marx denounced "utopian socialism" as "unscientific" because it lacked a theory of history, he incorporated the utopian vision as the end-point of his philosophy when he anticipated socialism's arriving at a "classless society" after the "dictatorship or the proletariat" had eliminated the residual traits of capitalism.  Thinkers who have based their utopianism on a Rousseauistic view of human nature include: Sir Thomas More (who preceded Rousseau), Bakunin, Kropotkin, Chernyshevsky, Bellamy, Fourier, George Orwell and Marcuse.

            (2) The values it asserts are distinctly at odds with so-called "bourgeois" values.  They militate against competitiveness, acquisitiveness and the pursuit of individual self-interest.  Accordingly, those who hold to it are provided the basis for a thorough-going critique or existing society, which is seen as at odds with human nature as best conceived.

            (3) The utopian vision provides a compelling "end" that has often served to justify even the most extreme of "means."  We need to be sensitive to a point that is often overlooked in today's milieu: that anyone who advocates violent revolution or even piecemeal terrorism against advanced civilization is actually opting for a course of

action that is potentially disastrous as well as bloody.   In reality he calls for the death and mutilation of countless people; and beyond that he makes problematic the very existence of a decent and humane social order.  Such a hierarchy of values is only possible for him because in the depths of his alienation he has devalued entirely the existing social order.  He calls, in effect, for mankind to leap over an abyss.  This is plausible rather than ludicrous only if (a) conditions on the current side of the abyss are felt to be bad enough to provoke the leap (and here his alienation comes in to reinforce this feeling), and (b) the prospective conditions on the other side are thought to be a substantial improvement. The utopianism, if taken seriously, supplies this second aspect.

            Needless to say, the expectation of a utopian outcome leads to the disillusionment that follows someone’s actual experience with revolution and collective power. This disillusionment is itself an important part of the history of twentieth century socialist thought.

            An anomalous fact about this optimistic expectation of general altruism is that most of its proponents have not thought it inconsistent with their view that millions of people are inert and trapped by their environment. It is as if the intellectual were compartmentalizing: when he thinks about the future possibilities, he tends to project his own traits onto humanity; but when he contemplates present humanity his moral elitism and his desire to champion the have-not as against the acting man of commerce and industry cause him to see people as lethargic and unintelligent.  As such, they are not only susceptible to capitalist exploitation; they are ready subjects for the socialist's compassion.

            To me, there is significant incongruity in this dual imputation of inertness and altruistic goodness. For a thinker to stay with both consistently, he would have to endorse a sort of altruism that would come from a less-than-fully-energetic type of humanity.  I notice that George Bernard Shaw, though, found an ingenious way around this incongruity.  Asserting a plausible half-truth, he wrote that "people who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbors, become very rich... On the other hand, people who are generous, public-spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents"l   Shaw has avoided the dilemma by substituting a causal relationship between goodness and poverty for the usual socialist perception that inertness and entrapment go together. The poor man, he says, is not so much inert as he is considerate.

            Examples of Rousseauistic optimism in socialist writing.   Rousseau himself wrote that "man is by nature good... (M)en are depraved and perverted by society."2   George Lichtheim accordingly can say that "Christianity had tended to regard human nature as ineradicably evil. Rousseau believed it was fundamentally good."3

            This appears in anarchist thought when D. Novak writes that "if men followed their natural instincts, they would live in peace and harmony with their neighbors and there would be no need of coercive institutions." He speaks of "a stateless society of perfect equality and freedom, in which the original attributes of human nature would attain their full expression."4 Lichtheim tells us that Bakunin's views were that "the social community is essentially harmonious, for man is essentially good.   It is the state that blocks the way to freedom, or rather state and Church combined.  Both must be swept away."5   Fried and Sanders say about Kropotkin that as "with all anarchists, Kropotkin believed that man is good and that external authority is evil."6  They mention the split among anarchists between those who hold that the natural man is basically individualistic and those who hold that he is group-oriented.  They say that Kropotkin was of the latter type, asserting a "natural solidarity" among men.

            David Caute tells us that "according to George Orwell, the Left inherited the belief that truth will prevail and that man is naturally good but corrupted by his environment."7

            Kenneth and Patricia Dolbeare have posed the issue sharply: "Is man, by nature, egoistic, competitive, and aggressive -- as assumed by conservatism, capitalism, liberalism, and reform liberalism?  Or is he, by nature, cooperative and rendered competitive only by the teachings of a capitalist value system and its artificial scarcities?" They indicate that both Marxism and the New Left have held to the latter view, which corresponds with Rousseau's.8   I notice that in an article in a recent issue of the Monthly Review, an independent socialist journal, Harold Freeman writes that "the desire to own anything privately is not 'human nature,' but rather, human nature historically conditioned by early capitalism."9

            A scattering of other views not tied into the Rousseauistic perception.  There is nothing logically imperative that requires that a socialist embrace Rousseau's optimism.  In fact, a deep pessimism such as the Burkean espouses could serve as the basis for advocating the organic ties of a socialist society.  Werner Sombart, for example, wrote during his Nazi phase that "we believe in no purification of man; we do not believe in the 'natural goodness of man,'... we believe rather, that man will persist in sin till the end of time."10

            R. H. Tawney yearned for an altruistic human nature, but was realistic enough to acknowledge that it doesn't exist: "Men work more and dispute less when goods are private than when they are common.  But it (private property) is to be tolerated as a concession to human frailty, not applauded as desirable in itself; the ideal -- if only man's nature could rise to it -- is communism."11

            My reading has shown me that Comte, Hegel, Bertrand Russell, Sidney Webb and even Gandhi have held views of human nature at odds with Rousseau's.12

 

NOTES

1.      George Bernard Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism (New York: Brentano’s Publishers, 1928), p. 27.

2.      Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile (New York: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1911), p. 22.

3.      George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 22.

4.      Leonard I. Krimerman and Lewis Perry (ed.s), Patterns of Anarchy (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1966), p. 7.

5.      Lichtheim, Socialism, p. 134.

6.      Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders (ed.s), Socialist Thought (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1964), p. 345.

7.      David Caute, The Left in Europe (Since 1789) (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 12.

8.      Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, American Ideologies (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 235.

9.      Article by Harold Freeman, Monthly Review, September, 1979, p. 25.

10.  Werner Sombart, A New Social Philosophy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 146.

11.  R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Mentor Books, 1960), p. 35.

12.  Here are the references I have at hand relative to the authors mentioned in the texts:  As to Comte:  John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 79, 80; as to Hegel:  T. M. Knox, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 265; as to Bertrand Russell:  Krimerman and Perry, Anarchy, p. 491; as to Sidney Webb:  Fried and Sanders, Socialist Thought, p. 398; as to Gandhi:  Erich Fromm (ed.), Socialist Humanism (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), p. 101.