[This is Chapter Seventeen of Murphey’s book Socialist Thought.]

 

Chapter 17

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS

            The concepts that have come to be fundamental to the ideological superstructure of the Left are, of course, closely related to the alliance of the alienated intellectuals with the have-nots and to the Left's central worldview that much of kind is entrapped and exploited.  If we consider the content the Left has given to such concepts as "equality," "freedom," "compassion," and "social justice," we see it has interpreted each of them consistently as parts of an overall system of thought.

            In this chapter, we will see how these concepts have been used by socialist authors. We will be able to note differences among them and to compare the Left's concepts with those of classical liberalism and Burkean conservatism.

            Equality.  The Burkean conservative has not been philosophically committed to a concept of equality at all, except to the extent that he has embraced the criteria of the Rule of Law.  Burkeans have believed in the value of a hierarchical social system.  Classical liberals, on the other hand, have militated historically for the abolition of all established class structures, and have wanted a "free-floating" system in which individuals rise or fall depending upon their success in the marketplace.  Sir Henry Maine praised this as a movement from a society based on "status" to one based on "contract."  Here, the concept of equality is one of "equality under the rules."  The same laws are to apply to all citizens, just as the same basketball rulebook applies to both teams opposing each other on a basketball court.

            The Left is almost universally critical of the classical liberal preference for "equality under the law.”  To an egalitarian socialist, this is essentially inhumane.  It involves treating unequals equally, without regard to the effect upon them.  People who are trapped and exploited cannot flourish, he says, under a system of equal rules.  Rather, what is needed is to “treat unequals unequally to produce an equal result.”  This shifts the focus to the equality of outcome.  If we were to continue our analogy to sports, we would see that this is like the “handicapping” system in golf, bowling or horse-racing, where those of lesser attainment are given a bonus to equalize their chances.

            Anatole France made a classic statement of this criticism when he commented satirically that “the Law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”1  Maurice Cornforth explained the viewpoint:  “So long as the system of exploitation of man by man remains there remain gross inequalities between men, which are only glossed over, but not alleviated, by the existence of certain ‘equalities’ of political rights and ‘equality before the law.’”2   Lenin expressed the same thought when he wrote that “every right is an application of the same measure to different people who, in fact, are not the same and are not equal to one another; this is why ‘equal right’ is really a violation of equality, an injustice.”3 (His emphasis)

            Various socialists have advocated some form or another of equality of property and/or income, achieved either through a redistribution of what occurs within a market economy or through the allocations made by a collectivist economy.   Fried and Sanders tell us that in the eighteenth century Babeuf wanted “equality of wealth.”4 We recall that Sir Thomas More and Campanella had earlier wanted a “community of goods” in their respective utopias.  In the late nineteenth century, Edward Bellamy described his proposed system of equal remuneration to all members of the society when he set out the following conversation: "'By what title does the individual claim his particular share? What is the basis of allotment?'   'His title,' replied Dr. Leete, 'is his humanity...'   'The fact that he is a man!'   I repeated, incredulously.  'Do you possibly mean that all have the same share?' 'Most assuredly.'" 5

            In his "Manifesto of the Equals" in 1796, Sylvain Marechal had called for "the Community of Goods! No more individual ownership of the land: the land belongs to no one.  We are demanding... communal enjoyment of the fruits of the earth."6

            More recently, Norman Thomas has written that there ought to be changes in the national distribution of income" and also in the world distribution.7   The Dolbeares tell us that Bayard Rustin argues in favor of the black liberation movement 's "insistence that emphasis be placed upon equality of condition rather than equality of opportunity."8

            In the May, 1979, World Marxist Review, published by the Soviet bloc Communist parties, there is an article on "New Frontiers of Soviet Economic Science."  We are told that "an important place is held by the problems of distributive relations."  These are said to be "linked with the implementation of socialism's principle 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work,' and also of the ways and means of gradually effecting a transition to the community principle of 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.'"9  This ties in with Marx's phase-theory that there would be a "socialist" phase under the dictatorship of the proletariat, followed ultimately and finally by the "communist" phase.  Absolute equality involving "payment according to needs" is not to come until the communist phase.  It is remarkable that Soviet Marxists are still talking theoretically in those terms. (They are somewhat reminiscent of the early centuries of Christianity, during which Christians looked forward to the imminent second coming of Christ.)

            It ought to be obvious that the extent of redistribution will depend heavily upon how far the particular socialist is able to take his society from the existing bourgeois competitive system.  Advocates of a welfare state and social democrats in general are not in a position to incorporate total levelling or a complete “community of goods” in their program.

            Most people are unaware that Nazi ideology strongly emphasized equality.  David Schoenbaum has spelled out what this amounted to in his book Hitler’s Social Revolution:  “The Third Reich offered a labor ideology… The centerpiece was the labor ethos, focusing not so much on the workers as on work itself… An idealized, generalized image of the ‘the worker’ was invoked to achieve the psychological assimilation of the worker into the life of the nation… Equality was a key word, not economic but, as it were, spiritual equality… Ley declared officially, ‘There are no longer classes in Germany.  In the years to come, the worker will lose the last traces of inferiority feelings he may have inherited from the past.”  Schoenbaum quotes a prison camp guard as saying that “nowadays, six nights a week, all the seats in the theatre cost the same.  First come, first served.  Sometimes the Hubers sit in the tenth row, and we sit in the twentieth.  But my wife knows that’s because the Hubers live nearer the theatre.”10 George Mosse says “the Nazi system was not to be a mere dictatorship from above, but was supposed to be based upon a truly democratic principle of government.  The worldview is basic once again to an understanding of the Nazi meaning of democracy.  Fuhrer and Volk were equal in kind because they shared the same race and blood.”  He includes a passage from Jakob Graf that says that “if we reach this goal, then all party and class divisions sink into nothingness.”  As part of carrying this out, the Nazis had university students work “side by side with working-class or peasant youths” in the Labor Service (the Arbeitsdienst), according to Mosse.  “By performing manual work in the fields or on public-works projects, the university student became the equal of everyone else.”11

            The recent Polish film “Man of Marble” shows scenes from the earlier Stalinist era that are startlingly similar to the scenes of collective élan depicted in Hitler’s propaganda film “Triumph of the Will.”

            Nevertheless, some socialist authors have not wanted to emphasize equality.  Sombart supported

Nazism, but was able to favor paying "each according to his due. The command of justice requires this, for where there is equality, there is always injustice."l2   Clinton Rossiter quotes Stalin as having told the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 that "it is time it was understood that Marxism is opposed to levelling."  Rossiter points out that it was in his Critique of the Gotha Programme that Marx made the" distinction between the "socialist" and "communist" phases.l3

            Freedom.  Certain styles have developed in the semantic of modern ideology.  If someone uses the word “liberty,” the usage generally indicates he is a classical liberal.  Someone who uses the term “civil liberties,” as most modern welfare liberals in the United States do, is dropping economic freedom from his intended content, focusing on the various freedoms associated with participative political processes.

            The work “freedom” itself is used in many senses.  Anything a speaker considers harmful to people’s interests will perhaps be referred to as a type of “unfreedom”; and anything that enhances their interests can, just as amorphously, be thought to enhance their "freedom."  When used in this way, "freedom" is synonymous with "well-being."

            The proponents of each social philosophy necessarily think they are speaking to the main issues that bear on human well-being ''as best understood" (i.e., as understood by the philosophy).  It isn't surprising, then, that each philosophy appropriates the major emotive words -- "freedom," "equality," "justice" -- on behalf of its proposals about how society should best be constituted.

            Classical liberals see coercion as having been the central problem in history blocking human well-being. The word "freedom" (although they prefer "liberty") refers to minimizing coercion.

            The Left, however, perceives millions of people as trapped and exploited. The coercive power of the state is considered liberating if it acts on behalf of the have-nots as against the exploiters.  The resulting redistribution or planned economy is thought to be quite "free" compared with the alternative system, which is exploitive.

            Even National Socialism in Germany talked of "freedom."  This was the freedom to fulfill one's destiny as part of the master race.  Such fulfillment could not be attained if each individual just lived for his own purposes.

            My review of the uses given to the concept of freedom in socialist writing will need to be broken into several parts:

First, we should notice the opposition voiced to the classical liberal concept of freedom to pursue individual purposes.  Frederick Engels wrote: "Fine freedom, where the proletarian has no other choice than that of either accepting the conditions which the bourgeoisie offers him, or of starving, of freezing to death, of sleeping naked among the beasts of the forest!"14  Norman Thomas has complained about “this persistent identification of freedom with the right of strong or lucky men to make great profit out of absentee ownership or out of management and exploitation of other men’s labor.”15  

Second, probably the main use of the word “freedom” among socialists is to refer to the overcoming of exploitation and to provide the “means of life” to people who have lacked them.

            Adam Ulam said that socialist freedom consists of “the doctrine that freedom is a positive concept rather than a negative one and that it consists of opportunities for self-expression rather than of the lack of constraints upon liberty.”16

            Ferdinand Lassalle wrote that “the course of history is a struggle against nature, against need, ignorance and impotence… The progressive overcoming of this impotence, -- this is the evolution of liberty.”  The state was to play a liberating role in helping organize the working class:  “It is the business and duty of the State to make it possible for you to take in hand the great cause of the free, individual association of the working class… Now, do not allow yourselves to be deceived and misled by the cry of those who will tell you that any such intervention by the State destroys social incentive.  It is not true that I hinder anybody from climbing a tower by his own strength if I hand him a ladder or a rope.”17

            Thomas Kirkup states Louis Blanc’s view as having been that “the intervention of a democratic government on behalf of the people, whom it represented, would remove the misery, anarchy, and oppression necessarily attendant on the competitive system, and in place of the delusive liberty of laissez-faire, would establish a real and positive freedom.”18

            This concept is sometimes used in a more generalized way that goes far beyond overcoming the plight of the have-nots and refers to making possible anyone’s "full achievement of potential."  Hubert Humphrey, an American liberal, asked "how free is a scientist if he does not have equipment and facilities with which to do research?"19  We should notice that Humphrey is not asking whether the scientist has been coercively denied the equipment.  His usage is consistent with Leslie Derfler's observation about socialism that "socialism possessed an individualist ideal, to assure everyone the 'integral development of his personality.'"20

Third, another of the main uses of the word "freedom" by socialist thought has been to describe the fulfillment an individual is expected to receive from becoming part of a movement larger than himself.  He gains "freedom" by losing himself in the higher destiny.  The form the larger movement will take differs from one type of socialism to the next.

Hegel identified monarchy with a system in which "all are free."2l  He wrote that "since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity... (T)he individual's destiny is the living of a universal life."22

There is no difficulty seeing how this fed into both leftwing and rightwing Hegelianism. The Nazi Gerhard Wagner could later say that "loyal to the will and the instructions of the Fuhrer, we shall fulfill our tasks in the future: to form the new German man, the new German people, which will assert its place in the world in strength, in honor, and in freedom."  Another Nazi, Walter Schultze, wrote that "we proceed here from a notion of freedom that is specifically our own, since we know that freedom must have its limits in the actual existence or the Volk. Freedom is conceivable only as a bond to something that has universal validity, a law of which the whole nation is the bearer."  He said that "ultimately freedom is nothing else but responsible service on behalf or the basic values of our being as a Volk."23

The Marxist perspective has been a combination of this "freedom through immersement in the collective" concept and the preceding idea that freedom comes through having been provided the means to a satisfactory life. Engels wrote that after the revolution and the socialization of the means of production "'Man, at last the master of his own form of social organization, becomes at the same time the lord over Nature, his own master -- free."  And

Lenin wrote that it only "becomes possible to speak of freedom" after the withering away of the state leads to the final stage in the dialectic of history.24

Fourth, a very different idea of freedom, which arose in part from the desire by members of the New Left to negate the bourgeois preference for responsibility and in part relates to the individualistic anarchist’s opposition to all constraints, has been the notion that freedom is "doing your own thing."  Chernyshevsky yearned to suffer no limits.  This appeared in his philosophy, say, about the relationship between the sexes:  "I loved her much, and would have violated my nature to put myself in greater harmony with her; that would have given me pleasure, but my life would have been under restraint."25   Rousseau had railed against the constraints civilization placed onto people: "Civilized man is born and dies a slave. The infant is bound up in swaddling clothes, the corpse is nailed down in his coffin. All his life long man is imprisoned by our institutions." He said "the natural man lives for himself."26  For obvious reasons, the more disciplined factions within the New Left opposed this attitude, since they knew that collective effort, first for revolution and then to make socialism work, would require the individual’s much greater commitment to group values.

Fifth, there are assorted other uses.  As Friedrich Hayek has pointed out in a chapter that compares the different meanings, "freedom" is some times used narrowly to denote just "political freedom."27  This usage is objectionable from a classical liberal standpoint because it tells us nothing about the fate of the individual.

There is also a meaning that" refers to "spiritual " freedom. This a usage appears, for example, when we say about a person who has died after long suffering that "he is finally free."  The stoics thought a man free who made himself a pillar of strength, counting on nothing from the rest of the world.  We can even speak of the "freedom" of someone who is in chains if he somehow manages to cultivate a soaring and independent spirit.

It is worth noting that socialism has suffered a loss of momentum in its advocacy of freedom. Ralph Miliband has written that "one reason for the present crisis of socialism is that it is not generally taken to be related to this concrete libertarianism but to bureaucracy and repression, at the limit in the form of Stalinism. The future of socialism, in England and elsewhere, is bound up with the rehabilitation of the idea that it is a libertarian project."28 We are reminded, at least in part, of classical liberalism’s loss of reformist thrust a century ago.

Social justice.  TheLeft's concept of "social justice" is so impressed on our minds that we have difficulty thinking of an alternative.  To the Left, there is "social injustice" in the perceived system of entrapment and exploitation; there is "social justice" in overcoming the exploited’s predicament. The Marxist, of course, superimposes his dialectical view of historical processes: social injustice is present in all phases of history until the dictatorship of the proletariat finally gives way to the withering away of the state and to the "classless society."  I should add that in the literature the term "distributive justice" is often used as a synonym for "social justice."

This is all very much at odds with the classical liberal view.  The classical liberal considers it just for people to receive the benefits or burdens of their own success or failure within the voluntaristic milieu of the market place. He sees injustice in deviating coercively from that process.  There is "distributive justice" in the successful making more and those who are less efficient in serving consumer demand making less.

Compassion.  The classical liberal believes a market economy serves human well-being better than any alternative, and so he does not agree that his philosophy "lacks compassion."  But the egalitarian socialist, with his view that there is widespread entrapment and exploitation, emphasizes the compassionate aspects of caring about the plight of those who are exploited.  David Caute accordingly speaks about "sympathy for the oppressed."29 Needless to say, this is major theme for the Left.

This emphasis can be misleading, however. Atrocities that surpass anything ever before committed in history have occurred in the twentieth century in the name of socialism, both left and right. The world is well aware of the enormities committed by the Nazis; it is not nearly as aware of the greater atrocities perpetrated by Stalin and Mao and by the Communists in Cambodia.  The brutalities have not all been the result of unfortunate turns of events, warping what have otherwise been good intentions. The Nazis held explicitly to a theory of brutality. If words mean anything at all, the Marxist-Leninists have to know, especially now after so much graphic experience, that their call for revolution and for a dictatorship of the proletariat is a call for effusive bloodshed and repression.

Most people reading a history of socialist thought will think of Proudhon as one of the leaders of humane socialist thinking in the nineteenth century. He was aligned with neither of the later totalitarian schools, Nazism or Marxist-Leninism; and his name is associated with anarchism, which suggests an opposition to all oppression. But

here is the sort of thing he actually wrote: "Let us conclude, with the mystics Ancillon, de Maistre and Portalis, ... that war in one form or another is essential to mankind.... God forbid that I should preach the gentle virtues and joys of peace to my fellow men... (W)hat I like most in man is the bellicose temperament."   In 1847 he was one of the first to suggest the extermination of the Jews!  Here is what a footnote to his Selected Writings tells us: "Proudhon's diaries reveal that had almost paranoid feelings of hatred against the Jews.   In 1847 he considered publishing... an article against the Jewish race, which he said he 'hated.'  The proposed article would have 'Called for the expulsion of the Jews from France, except for those married to Frenchwomen; the abolition of all their synagogues; the denial to them of all employment; the abolition of their cult... The Jew is the enemy of the human race.  This race must be sent back to Asia, or exterminated."'30 (Emphasis added)

The compassion shown by modern socialist thought reflects an alliance of the intellectual with the have-nots.  Accordingly, there must always be the suspicion that the compassion is only as permanent as that alliance. There is an abundance of evidence to indicate that compassion is not an inherent part of the psychological make-up of many socialists.

Elitism.  The ideological superstructure of equality, freedom and compassion is also contradicted by the elitism that has been so recurrent within socialist thought.

Elitism isn't unusual in itself.  What is unusual is that a point of view that has championed the cause of the have-not should have a significant strain of elitism.

Lichtheim tells us that "Proudhon in 1848 confided to his diary the rather undemocratic thought 'The representative of the people -- that I am.  For I alone am right.'"  He also says about the Fabian society in Britain that "there was never any question of' enrolling numerous members.  The Society was elitist and determinedly so." Lichtheim comments that "Shaw... was an instinctive elitist, as his subsequent adoption of Nietzschean doctrines (not to mention his later flirtation with Mussolini) was to show... (B)y the later 1890's Shaw had become totally cynical about democracy and convinced that the principal obstacle to the spread of socialism was 'the stupidity of the working class."'31

Lewis S. Feuer writes that "for a number of years, the chief spokesman of the alienated intellectuals in America was C. Wright Mills.  He explicitly urged that Marxists should rid themselves of their 'labor metaphysic' and overtly justify the role and rule of the intellectual elite as the sole progressive force in the world."  Feuer adds that "the intellectuals -- in Marx's term, the 'ideological class' -- have in all societies felt themselves an aristocracy, an elite."32

Two books that are informative in this area are Konrad and Szelenyi's The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, which dissects the situation within the Soviet-bloc countries, and Alvin Gouldner's The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class.33

 

NOTES

 

  1. Hubert H. Humphrey, The Cause is Mankind (New York: Macfadden Books, 1965), p. 18.
  2. Maurice Cornforth, The Open Philosophy and The Open Society (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 285.
  3. Stefan Possony (ed.), The Lenin Reader (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966), p. 203.
  4. Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders, Socialist Thought (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1964), p. 14.
  5. Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward (New York: Signet Classic, 1960), p. 75.
  6. Fried and Sanders, Socialist Thought, p. 53.
  7. Norman Thomas, Socialism Re-examined (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 143.
  8. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, American Ideologies (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 126.
  9. Article, “New Frontiers of Soviet Economic Science,” World Marxist Review, May, 1979, pp. 112-113.
  10. David Schoenbaum, Hitler’s Social Revolution (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 79, 80, 112, 299.
  11. George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966), pp. xxxvi, 84, 269.
  12. Werner Sombart, A New Social Philosophy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 206.
  13. John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.s), Failure of a Dream?  Essays in the History of American Socialism (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974), p. 471.
  14. Frederick Engels, The Condition of Working-Class in England in 1844 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952), p. 76.
  15. Article by Norman Thomas, “Humanistic Socialism and the Future,” Socialist Humanism (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), p. 350.
  16. Adam B. Ulam, Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 134.
  17. The German Classics (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, 1914), pp. 453, 509.
  18. Thomas Kirkup, History of Socialism (New York: The Macmillan company, 1909), p. 45.
  19. Humphrey, The Cause Is Mankind, p. 66.
  20. Leslie Derfler, Socialism Since Marx (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), p. 59.
  21. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of History (New York:  P. F. Collier & Son, 1905), J. Sibrea (tran.s), p. 164.
  22. T. M. Knox, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 156.
  23. George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966), pp. 234, 315-316.
  24. Fried and Sanders, Socialist Thought, pp. 324, 473.
  25. N. G. Chernyshevsky, What Is To Be Done? (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 268.
  26. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile (New York: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1911), pp. 10, 7.
  27. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), Chapter 1.
  28. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (ed.s), The Socialist Register 1977 (London: The Merlin Press, 1977), pp. 41-42.
  29. David Caute, The Left in Europe (Since 1789) (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 44.
  30. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 206, 210, 227-228.
  31. George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 124, 191, 192.
  32. Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 5, 59.
  33. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979); George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, In., 1979).