[This is Chapter Eighteen of Murphey’s book Socialist Thought.]

 

Chapter 18

LIFESTYLE AND VALUES

 

            There are some major themes within socialist thought about lifestyles and values, but there is certainly no unanimity.           

Some of the themes deal, of course, with what socialists oppose. Since socialists generally agree upon their opposition to the middle class and to a market economy, their writing emphasizes anti-bourgeois and anti-competitive themes.  Many socialist authors also stress their opposition to "materialism," which in this usage refers to the affluent, comfort-oriented lifestyle of an "over-productive" society.

It is not nearly so clear what socialists would establish in place of the society they oppose.  One significant branch of thought wants a lifestyle of relaxation, play, sexual fulfillment, serenity, pacifism, and freedom from the boredom and pressures of work.  This theme has been repeated throughout the history of socialist thought, but it is perhaps best known from its expression within the "counterculture" of the American New Left in the 1960s and early 1970s.

A significant theme runs counter to this, however.  It stresses a yearning for "heroic" values, "the strong life," picking up ideas expressed so forcefully by Carlyle and Nietzsche.  Sometimes it extols war.  A variation of this theme stresses "righteousness," which points toward the ascetic.

The opposition to "bourgeois materialism and competition.”  These themes extend into a criticism of virtually every facet of bourgeois culture.  Rousseau spoke unfavorably of "this desire of being talked about... this unremitting rage of distinguishing ourselves."l  He thereby established a theme that was elaborated upon at length by Thorstein Veblen in Theory of the Leisure Class and that has been explored voluminously in modern literature. The opposition to competition quite naturally extends to such things as the giving of grades in school, so that the Dolbeares mention a desire to see the "abolition of the grading system."2

The desire here is for human relationships that are self-fulfilling while at the same time mutually supportive. The feeling is that competition diminishes both parties: to the victor, it substitutes a lesser set of values; he comes to see winning as the goal rather than attainment for its own sake; and it tells the loser that his own attainment is second-rate.  These concerns are apparent among those parents who prefer that their children participate in sports that "are for fun, rather than for seeing who can win."  They are articulated frequently at the Academy Awards ceremony for motion pictures when a recipient says that he's sorry that there are awards because there is an implicit slap at "the many creative people who did not win."

In my discussion of classical liberalism in the preceding volume, I observed that classical liberalism seeks to carve out a substantial place for such a non-competitive value system when it supports "feminine" role-assignments for women. Such a cultural differentiation tends to commit half the human race to nurturing, supportive, accepting relationships.  Although classical liberals have not often analyzed such things, they can see considerable value in this differentiation.  They recognize, though, that there needs to be a tougher dimension, at least in the world as it exists and will exist for a long time.  The "masculine" dimension involves grappling with a hard world, the cultivating of an ability to deal with the sterner aspects of reality.  Thus we see that one of the points of ideological difference between classical liberalism and much socialist thought is about whether both sexes should be "feminized."   (Ironically, the "women's liberation" movement, despite being influenced by many of the concepts of the Left, often presses to make women more masculine by insisting that they join the competitive nexus.  Needless to say, the longer-term goal of the Left is to lessen the competitive features of life for both sexes.)

There is also opposition to the "materialistic" features of bourgeois society.  Fried and Sanders write that socialist thought is "in a sense, anti-economic," in that it wants "to put the economic forces in their place, to subordinate them to human life."3   Werner Sombart wrote that "'Comfortism,' the name I have given to this practical materialism, which means the deviation of the direction of human life toward amenity-values, brings the whole body of people to decay... The necessity or filling the void created in the materialistic soul after each enjoyment by a new enjoyment, has led to the chase in which modern man spends his life."4

Probably the most sophisticated discussion of the spiritual effects of a materially-oriented culture comes from Marx’s early writings, which were rediscovered in the middle of the twentieth century and became important to the New Left.  This involves the Marxian concepts of "alienation," "reification" and "the fetishism of commodities," all of which are associated.  Predrag Vranicki has written of "the 'thingification' of man, as one of the essential forms of man's alienation in bourgeois society."  He explains the viewpoint quite well: "The classic society of commodity production has converted everything into a commodity, into a thing. The worker in such a society sells his ability to work just as everybody else sells whatever is at his disposal -- a commodity, his mind, his ideas, a trade, his body, or his talent.  Relationships have clearly been deprived of the fundamental characteristics of humanity if the entire society amounts to a relationship of buying and selling, if man has become a statistical cipher, and if man is regarded as though he were part of a mechanism... This alienation of contemporary man's everyday life is the foundation and source for all the other forms of his alienated condition...  (T)he commodities which he produces counterpose themselves to him as either a power or a challenge.  The fetishism of commodities5 (His emphasis)

This criticism of bourgeois society has, of course, been made quite independently of Marx.  It is in the tradition of Thomas Carlyle's complaints about the "cash-nexus."  And writing before Marx's early writings were rediscovered, Werner Sombart caught the essence of it: "The declining scale is as follows: from spiritual value to performance value, from performance value to result value, from result value to value of visible result, from value of visible result to value capable of being coined."6

In the same vein, Mussolini complained that "anything in those days that did not have a material value seemed to be superfluous. These were years when men's hearts were grey."7

I discussed this same issue earlier in the present volume in connection with the alienation of the intellectual (which is, by the way, a different usage of the word "alienation" than Marx used in the analysis we have just discussed).  The reader will want to reread those pages to recall my criticism of the position.

Advocacy of a lifestyle of relaxation and play.   Most people think of the New Left's "counterculture" as the prime example of a "do your own thing; let it all hang out" way of life. What they don't realize is that the so-called "New" Left adopted virtually all of its ideas from nineteenth century socialist thought.

Charles Fourier in the early nineteenth century wished, according to Fried and Sanders, "to formulate a social order in which work should be nothing but play."  There was also a strong sexual emphasis: "The crux of Fourier's scheme was the principle of what he called passional attraction.   The evils of the world existed because human beings were not permitted by 'civilization' to live in accordance with their passions.  For many of the Fourierists, free love was prominent among the remedies...."18

The latter point also appeared in Feuerbach’s thinking.  Lewis Feuer tells us that "German philosophy had negated the human body; the new philosophers, disciples of Ludwig Feuerbach, affirmed it.  The root meaning of 'alienation' for Feuerbach was, it must be emphasized, sexual; the alienated man was one who had acquired a horror of his sexual life."19

Charles Reich has said of Marx that "he could write as a Utopian in The German Ideology that with the advent of communist society, it would be ‘possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.’"10   We see Marx, then, as a source of the anti-vocation viewpoint that was so prominent during the New Left in the writings of Jack Kerouac and Charles Reich.

Chernyshevsky expressed the viewpoint best: "I have a few hundred rubles, and I wish to live at my ease and without doing anything.  When I grow weary of idleness, I shall look for work.  Of what sort?  It is of no consequence.  Where?   It  matters not.  I am as free as a bird, and I can be as careless as a bird."11

The opposite theme: socialists who yearn for the "heroic" or for ascetic morality.  In Chapter 1 we saw how Campanella imagined a utopian society in which martial virtues were stressed.  In our own century, Mussolini found life's meaning in overcoming obstacles: "The difficulties of life have hardened my spirit.  They have taught me how to live."12

Werner Sombart in Germany praised Mussolini: "It was Mussolini who had this sentence stamped upon a coin: 'Meglio un giorno un leone che cento anni una pecora' (Better a lion for a day than a sheep for a century)." Sombart generalized about two opposing styles of life: "Trader and hero: they form the two great contrasts; they likewise form the two poles of all human orientation on earth.  The trader, as we have seen, enters upon life with the question: What can life give me?  He wants to get for himself the greatest possible gain for the least possible achievement, he wishes to make life a gainful business; that means, he is poor.  The hero meets life with the question: What can I give to life?  He wishes to bestow, to lavish himself without return; that means, he is rich." This is a watershed, Sombart said, that even carries over into types of socialism: "So we may conclude that there is also, depending upon the spirit which rules, an heroic and a trader Socialism."13

Proudhon wrote that "war is divine, that is to say it is primordial, essential to life... Death is the crown of life.  How could man, who is a thinking, moral, free being, have a more noble end?... Strength, bravery, virtue, heroism, the sacrifice of possessions...."14  Kirkup said of Proudhon that "his life was marked by the severest simplicity and even puritanism."15

John Stuart Mill's description of Auguste Comte reminds me of the other-worldliness of Augustinian Christianity: “Any indulgence, even in food, not necessary to health and strength, he condemns as immoral.  All gratifications, except those of the affections, are to be, tolerated only as ‘inevitable infirmities.’”16

 

NOTES

 

  1. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality (no frontispiece as to publisher or year), p. 67.
  2. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, American Ideologies (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 165.
  3. Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders (ed.s), Socialist Thought (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1964), p. 4.
  4. Werner Somabrt, A New Social Philosophy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 34.
  5. Erich Fromm (ed.), Socialist Humanism (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 302, 301.
  6. Sombart, A New Social Philosophy, p. 22.
  7. Benito Mussolini, My Autobiography (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1939), p. 112.
  8. Fried and Sanders, Socialist Thought, pp. 128, 127.
  9. Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals (Garden City  Anchor Books, 1969), p. 74.
  10. Quoted in Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals, p. 185.
  11. N. G. Chernyshevsky, What Is To Be Done?  (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 272.
  12. Mussolini, My Autobiography, p. 26.
  13. Sombart, A New Social Philosophy, pp. 73, 72.
  14. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 202, 203, 207.
  15. Thomas Kirkup, History of Socialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), p. 53.
  16. John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 139.