[This is Chapter Six of Murphey’s book Socialist Thought.]
Chapter 6
THE TONE OF MODERN
In the various chapters that make up Part I
of this book, we are looking at several factors that make up “the origins and
underlying dynamic of the Left.” Since
no doubt a great many factors have contributed to the rise of the Left, I don’t
wish to be understood as being so presumptuous as to say that we are covering
them all. We are just discussing those I
consider most fundamental.
As
modern society emerged from the shattering of the medieval consensus, it had no
agreed-upon paradigms from the past, even though it did enjoy the benefit of a
rich heritage. Modern civilization was
existentially indeterminate. Socialist
thought as we have seen it in modern life is one of the systems for mediating
social reality that arose in that context.
So far, in analyzing that rise, we have (1) noted certain continuities
from ancient and medieval thought, and (2) discussed at length the very
important phenomenon of the alienation of the intellectual.
At
least two factors of the utmost importance remain to be discussed. The one reviewed in this chapter has to do
with the role played by the qualitative level of average humanity during the
modern period. It is true that the
intellectual has played a crucial role, but what has been the qualitative
milieu in which he has acted? What is to
be said of the remainder of humanity and of the factors within that humanity
that have either lent themselves to, or led away from,
the rise of the Left? From these
questions we can see that we will have omitted a major dimension if we focus
exclusively on the role of the intellectual.
The
final factor, discussed in the next chapter, pertains to the weaknesses within
capitalism. Socialist thought has in
large measure seen itself as a reaction to the flaws of capitalism. In a single chapter we will not be able to
make a definitive discussion of those flaws, both supposed and real, but we
will seek to gain some perspective regarding them.
Seen
from the classical liberal point of view which I consider most valid, the
primary question about the qualitative level of modern man is whether he has
what it takes to develop and sustain a liberal civilization. To the extent the answer to this is in the
negative, we will be seeing some explanation of why modern society has slid
away from liberal values into one or more of the authoritarian and direct
action systems.
These
matters of “human nature” and “qualitative level” were themes in the first book
in this series, Understanding the Modern Predicament. Chapter 6 of that book discussed the role of
human nature in underlying the various social and political philosophies. Classical liberalism is based on a mixed
view. It assumes a substantial amount of
human capability in private affairs and potential for civic virtue in public
matters, but at the same time does not presume that the neurotic tearing within
the human race will vanish. It seeks
decentralization of power within a contractual nexus precisely because it fears
those neuroses, while at the same time it is affirmative in its view that a
contractual nexus can work.
Even
though classical liberalism is not utopian, we need to appreciate that it is a
form of civilization that can only flourish fully within a strong ethical
consensus and a more-or-less ubiquitous commitment to liberal values and
institutions. Not only does it need
sustenance from such a consensus; it also needs further perfection of its
values and institutions through a sustained period of experience and
reflection. Those values and institutions are only at an early level of
sophistication. This is one of the reasons the movement of the intellectuals
away from liberal values has been so damaging. It is also a reason any failure
in the commitment of the underlying corpus of mankind to liberal values is very
significant.
Chapter
8 of the earlier book related in detail the critique that the Spanish
philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset made of modern man.
In common with many serious observers, he was deeply pessimistic about the
qualitative level. He described the average man, the "mass man," as
being a primitive who has been born into advanced circumstances.
Self-satisfied, making few demands on himself, thinking that he already knows
everything, psychologically spoiled and therefore impatient of the
less-than-direct methods of a truly civilized mode of behaviour, this
"mass man," Ortega says, has established the tone of the modern age
by filling all its spaces. Such a man is given precisely to "direct
action" techniques, since his limitations lend themselves to no other. The
mass movement and the powerful state take their place as organized instruments
for this direct action. Liberal values, liberal institutions get short shrift.
Chapters
2 through 6 of Understanding the Modern Predicament sought to lend a
broader perspective to these observations by pointing out that mankind is indeed in its cosmic infancy. Civilization, and certainly
advanced civilization, is very new, if seen from an anthropological
perspective. I reviewed the ancient Greeks, the Romans and the Middle Ages to show how immaturity had affected them all,
and how none of them provided final paradigms for secular, rational man to
follow. The fault, I said, does
not lie exclusively with modern
"mass man."
Rather, the average humanity of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries should
be understood, as Ortega himself acknowledged, as being on a higher, not a
lower, level than the main body of mankind has occupied in the past. It is
simply that the literacy, affluence and social mobility of the past century or
two have not obliterated the inherent immaturity within humanity; and that,
again as Ortega pointed out, there is increased reliance upon average humanity
because the aristocracies of the past have been knocked out.
The reader is directed to the earlier book
for a more complete discussion of each of the aspects just mentioned.
What
we need to bring to mind right now is the extent to which these inherent
weaknesses undermine liberal civilization, thereby leading to one or the other
of the socialist (including fascist) alternatives.
Looking
beyond Western Europe and America, we see that in the vast continents of Asia,
Africa and Latin America the illiterate millions do not yet satisfy the
preconditions for liberal society. This is a fact pregnant with tragedy. It is compounded by the fact, too, that,
precisely because of the pressure from the Left and from an understandable
impatience to move quickly into an enjoyment of the fruits of advanced society,
these peoples are not being permitted to take their time to create those
prerequisites and, in addition, are not receiving the intellectual leadership
to do so. From a liberal point of view,
what those people most need is the empathy and assistance of advanced
civilization in moving ever closer to the cultural, institutional and
intellectual prerequisites. A desideratum that is of crucial immediacy is
population control, but that is negated by the primitiveness itself and by
ideological, religious and cultural perceptions that run directly counter to
their own long-term liberal interests.
If
then we turn our attention to the peoples of Eastern Europe, including those of the Soviet Union, we see that
they have so far had either no, or little, experience in liberal
self-government. They moved almost directly from feudalism into
totalitarianism. From a liberal perspective they are still tragically below the
threshold. [Note in 2003: The
long-term success or failure of those societies in the wake of the collapse of
the Soviet Union and of Communism will provide a valuable historical test of
the observation I made here. Needless to
say, I would hope that their lack of experience in self-government won’t prove
crucial.]
The
observations that Ortega and other serious observers such as Richard Weaver and
John Stuart Mill have made about the continued primitivism of modern man should
be placed in context as constituting a criticism of what is precisely the more
advanced form of average humanity, that of Western Europe and North America.
They point to the continued weakness even within that part of mankind that has
seemed most to surmount primitivism. The observations are in the nature of
pointing to the Emperor's new clothes: they relate to the fact that the higher
level of attainment serves partly as a veneer for an immaturity that has not
evaporated.
A
glance at the daily paper is adequate to establish the fact of immaturity. So
also is a sensitive awareness of the nuances of human relationships on a
day-to-day basis within ones own life; or the application of even the most
elementary aesthetic, moral or intellectual tests to the life that goes on so
normally around us. This would not be so
obvious were it not for the more egregious examples of flagrant behavior that have flashed constantly before us during the
twentieth century. They punctuate the fact, so that it should be apparent to
even the most accepting person. Last night on television, for example, I saw a
special that analyzed the factors that nurture the existence of Red Brigade
terrorism in Italy. Opinion polls in that country show that there is a
significant element of the population that actually romanticizes and identifies
with the bombings, assassinations and kidnappings.
I
have mitigated this pessimism in the past by pointing out that average humanity
has not really been put to a fair test in the twentieth century. We have seen
what the people of Western Europe and America have done in the absence a
supportive intellectual culture that is so vital to liberal civilization. With
all its faults, there is much that is positive that can be said for the result.
How much better might those societies have done if they had had the supporting
infrastructure that needs to suffuse a culture on an on-going basis with
edifying criticisms and insights? We can't really know, since that has yet to
be tried.
Before
we end the present discussion, it is important to notice that, as paradoxical
as it may seem, the very same weaknesses that have caused modern man to slide
away from liberalism and toward the authoritarian systems will necessarily bar
socialism from attaining any of the utopian goals that have been so alluring a
part of its vision. It should not to be a subject of self-congratulation, to a
sincere socialist, that modern man has been tenuous in his commitment to
liberal values. Clear-sighted men could and did predict that there would be no
withering away of the state within Marxism-Leninism. The Stalinist and
post-Stalinist outrages are not aberrations, as so much wishful thinking among
socialist humanists likes to suggest. A people that is not fitted to liberal
individualism, which after all presupposes quite an elaborate framework of law
and ethics, will not step naturally into the even higher responsibility that
utopianism takes for granted. About the best that can be hoped for is that the
ruling elite might sometime become more humane. Even if the ruling elite is the intellectual class, the result will
not be the same thing as has been promised for so long under the guise of
democracy.
I
am aware that a socialist will not perceive the qualitative level in nearly the
same way as I have described it here. The move toward socialism in the
twentieth century will not appear to him "a failure to sustain liberal
values," but will seem, instead, a promising affirmation of those values
as best understood (or else, to the dialectical materialist, at least an
evolution toward later stages in the dialectic).
But
the socialist should reflect upon this carefully. He will acknowledge that his own perception
of people even in Europe and American is not at all favorable,
viewing them as they are. The alienation of the intellectual has not just been
an alienation against the bourgeoisie, but against virtually all strata of
modern life. The question the socialist should ask himself is whether it is
really satisfactory to believe that these failings are primarily the warpings induced by capitalism and the pursuit of
materialistic values. Is there actually, as Herbert Marcuse
has postulated, resorting back to Rousseau, an "original human
nature" that is there to shine through when only the warpings
are removed? This is a large and difficult question. For my own thinking on it,
I will refer the reader to my chapters on the long-term immaturity of mankind
that appear in Understanding the Modern Predicament.